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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
People have always tried to find explanations for how and why things happen to 
and around them. In ancient times they used divine intervention as an explanation for 
phenomena they did not understand. Today we have laws of physics, chemistry or 
mechanics to explain the very same phenomena1, and while in the past many such causal 
explanations were simple, advances in science and technology now necessitate a deeper 
understanding of a multitude of causal relations in order to explain the same basic natural 
phenomena. Nevertheless, today as in ancient times, people need to understand causally 
linked events to “make sense” of the world around them (e.g., Hastie, 1984) or to come to 
terms with it.  
The fundamental cognitive process which allows people to understand and use 
causality is called causal reasoning (Rehder, 2003a). According to existing research 
people engage in causal reasoning to “make sense” of the world around them (Hastie, 
1984; Shank & Abelson, 1977) and to understand the physical world they live in (e.g., 
Brewer, Chinn, & Samarapungavan, 2000; Carey, 1995; Corrigan & Denton, 1996; 
Schlottmann, 2001; Thagard, 2000; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Relying on causal 
propositions, causal reasoning is the foundation of more complex forms of thinking and 
reasoning across domains (Jonassen & Ionas, 2006). It is required for making predictions, 
                                                
1 For example, why and how the sun rises every day, or why, how, and when rain 
falls. 
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drawing implications and inferences, and explaining phenomena. As Dickinson (2001) 
explains:  
Causal learning and representation is a fundamental form of 
cognition, if not the fundamental form. Without the capacity to 
learn about and represent causal relationships between our actions 
and their consequences, the mind would be radically disconnected 
from the world. (p. 3). 
Causal reasoning is also important for scientific thinking (Carey, 1995; Keil, 
1989), as relationships between any conceptual entities that interact directly or indirectly 
with each other are in most cases, causal. Therefore, to understand a domain people need 
to construct conceptual models using these causal relations. 
While understanding causality is fundamental for both scientific and everyday 
cognition, as well as for learning, research shows troublesome findings about the many 
problems people have when dealing with causality and causally linked events (Chapman 
& Chapman, 1969; Pennington & Hasties, 1988; Tversky & Cahneman, 1989). For 
example, people display a tendency to favor obvious, localized, simple, linear, and 
sequential causal relations (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Chi, 2000b; Driver, 
Guesne, & Tiberghien, 1985; Grotzer & Bell, 1999; Perkins & Grotzer, 2000; Spelke, 
Philips, & Woodward, 1996; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999). That is, people tend to simplify 
otherwise more complex causal structures – a process which results in a distorted 
understanding. Also, when solving well-structured problems people tend to use strategies 
that convert the problem's elements into calculations while missing the conceptual 
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underpinnings of the problem or domain – a strategy that leads to poor problem solving 
performance (Hegarty, Mayer, & Monk, 1995; Lucangeli, Tressoldi, & Cendron, 1998). 
Scholars also found that instead of updating or building new schemas, people 
would rather use their old schemas, even when their old schemas are no longer 
appropriate (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2006), as long as these old schemas have sufficient 
situational predictive power. That is, people tend to show resistance to change, even 
when an update to their mental model is needed as long as the model they currently hold 
serves their purposes. 
The notion of causality has been analyzed and debated for centuries in the 
scientific and philosophic community, but scholars have never reached common ground 
(e.g., Mooney Marini & Singer, 1988). Therefore, today there is no universally accepted 
definition of causality, although multiple attempts have been made over the years. In this 
controversy, David Hume (1739/1987) brought the most important contribution to 
understanding causality by showing that the idea of causation arises from the empirical 
relations of contiguity, temporal succession, and constant conjunction. More commonly 
understood, causality represents the relationship between two or more entities where the 
behavior of one or more of them determines the behavior of the other(s). Also, while 
fundamental, causality proves difficult to capture. That is, many scholars believe it is not 
possible to observe causality itself, but rather infer it from observable evidence (effects), 
such as the results of a process (e.g., Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Hume, 1739/1987; 
Young & Rogers, 2005). 
To observe, recognize and understand causality, people need to process at least 
two significantly different kinds of information – covariational and mechanistic. 
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Covariational information, seen by some scholars as the foundation of human causal 
induction, is emphasized by the human sensitivity to statistical data and indicates the 
probability of a cause producing an effect (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992). It is 
considered to be the quantitative representation of causal reasoning (Thagard, 1998). The 
mechanism information is focused on knowledge about the causal processes involved in 
understanding causality (Ahn & Kalish, 2000; T. R. Schultz, 1982). It qualitatively links 
the cause to its effect by explaining the chain of causal events that lead from the 
originating cause to the final effect (Thagard, 1998). Mechanism information provides 
the “how” and “why” of the causal process. 
Prior research conducted on the implementation of a cognitive flexibility 
hypertext2 development environment as a means for building cause maps3 in a marketing 
strategies class revealed that if one asks students to explain how each causal relation 
happens they build better and more detailed maps4 (Strobel, et al., 2008). This 
observation, supported by the students' opinions expressed during a focus group, suggests 
                                                
2 Cognitive Flexibility Hypertext (CFH) is a computer-based implementation of 
Cognitive Flexibility Theory (CFT). CFT is a model for designing nonlinear knowledge 
bases aimed at minimizing the biases that result from using oversimplified, prepackaged 
instructional materials. The hypertext provides nonlinear access to multiple 
representations of a domain's content (Strobel, Jonassen, & Ionas, 2008).  
3 Cause maps, also known as Influence Diagrams, are graph representations that 
can concisely represent a complex structure of interrelated causal relations. They are the 
result of a family of causal mapping techniques developed for systematical elicitation and 
representation of individuals' causal beliefs related to a particular issue or event (Axelrod, 
1976; Huff & Jenkins, 2002). 
4 Given an originating context or situation, the students were asked to develop an 
influence diagram to explain the impact of this originating cause on the performance of a 
company of their choice. That is, they were asked to show the most important direct and 
indirect influences the originating cause has on the behavior or status of the target 
company. This task usually involved developing a directed graph using paper and pencil. 
In this iteration, the students were asked to use the CFH application to perform the same 
task using a computer. The instructor evaluated their representations. 
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that asking people for explanations of causal mechanisms when describing a causal 
relationship can be beneficial. That is, asking students to explain the mechanism(s) by 
which the cause produces the effect could provide the means to alleviate some of the 
problems people have when dealing with causality and causal reasoning. 
Further study showed that the explanation of causal phenomena plays an 
important role in the understanding of causal relationships (Lombrozo, 2007; Slusher & 
Anderson, 1996; Van Fraassen, 1985). For example Ahn (1995) showed that seeking 
causal explanations is an innate trait people have, while Slusher and Anderson (1996) 
found that explanation availability is a mediator for the change in beliefs when causal 
arguments are involved. Researchers also found that explanations seem to be used by 
people as a foundation for further estimates of, for example, the probability that an event 
will occur (Lombrozo, 2007), or that to understand physics, people need an explanation 
to account for the dynamics of the phenomenon (Besson, 2004). Nevertheless, in many 
situations an explanation from an external source is not readily available. What is always 
available, though, is self-generated explanation (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reinmann, & 
Glaser, 1989), or self-explanation, which refers to the explanation a learner generates on 
his or her own, as opposed to explanations provided by an external source (i.e., instructor, 
book, etc.). 
Self-explanations are usually more effective than explanations provided by others 
because a) they require students to actively elaborate their prior knowledge, thus 
triggering more constructive learning processes, and b) are usually better targeted toward 
the learner's specific problem than to the explanations provided by others. Research (e.g., 
Chi, et al., 1989; Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994; Kastens & Liben, 2007; 
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Lombrozo, 2007) shows that self-explanation provides significant gains in performance 
for people using it compared to people that do not (e.g., Kastens & Liben, 2007). 
Studied in different contexts and for varied age groups, self-explanation proves to 
be a domain-independent strategy (Nathan, Mertz, & Ryan, 1994) that most high-
performance students use in linking prior knowledge to current content (Bielaczyc, 
Pirolli, & Brown, 1995). Nathan's study shows that self-explanation works better for 
conceptual reasoning while providing only marginal advantage for procedural contexts. It 
has also been shown that either guiding (Bielaczyc, et al., 1995) or prompting (Chi, et al., 
1994) people to self-explain improves performance. Studies also suggest that no matter 
how self-explanation happens, for example spoken aloud, in one’s head (Didierjean & 
Cauzinille-Marmèche, 1997) or written by hand or typed (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002), 
gains in performance are observed. This observation is also true for situations when 
feedback on the correctness of the explanation is provided (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002) 
or when it is not (Chi, et al., 1989; Chi, et al., 1994). 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility of using self-explanation 
to help learners reason better in contexts where causal reasoning is involved while at the 
same time advancing existing research in this area. Specifically, this study proposes to 
use self-explanation to elicit casual mechanism explanations when reasoning about 
causally linked events. The use of self-explanation or other cognitive strategies to elicit 
mechanism explanation can in the end become foundations for developing support 
methodologies for causal reasoning.  
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Localized in the field of medicine, a domain that relies on the understanding and 
use of extensive and complex causal processes, this study attempts to answer the 
following research question:  In the medical field, when learners are reasoning causally, 
does using self-explanation to elicit an explanation of the causal mechanism(s) improve, 
on average, learners’ performance on tasks involving such reasoning processes? 
Design of the Study 
To answer the research question this study employs both quantitative and 
qualitative methods for analyzing the data generated by a completely randomized two-
group, control and treatment, between-subjects experiment. The design of the experiment 
is based on the existing literature and on the lessons learned from two pilot studies aimed 
at developing this research methodology. For this study the treatment is adapted from a 
methodology used by Atkinson, Renkl, & Merrill (2003) in which they employed 
prompts to train learners to identify the underlying principle while solving practice 
problems.   
The treatment consists of three multiple choice questions, similar to those medical 
students and professionals answer during their coursework and during their certification 
examinations, and for which the participants assigned to the treatment group are asked to 
provide both an answer a brief account of what mechanisms might be at work in the 
presented question or context. Focused on short-term transfer, this intervention is 
intended to provide participants with opportunities to practice self-explanation of causal 
mechanisms when considering alternative answers to a causal problem, with the 
expectation that they will perform better, on average, than the control group on a 
subsequent similar problem. 
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The performance measurement task consisted of one multiple-choice question 
with only one correct answer, for which the participants first chose the answer and then 
explained the mechanisms that supported their choice. Following this, in an attempt to 
better understand the participants' reasoning processes, they were offered the opportunity 
to change their answer if they considered this necessary. At the same time, they were 
asked to explain why the new choice was better than the previous one.  
Since prior knowledge is reported to be important for both causal reasoning (e.g., 
Ahn & Baileson, 1996; Ahn, et al., 1995) and self-explanation (Chi, et al., 1989), this 
study includes a brief assessment of the participants’ prior knowledge in the three fields 
relevant to the instrument  topic: physiology, pathology, and immunology. The 
assessment of prior knowledge includes two components. First, the participants were 
asked to provide a self-assessment of their knowledge in each of the three fields. Second, 
the participants answered a set of six multiple-choice questions, two for each field. The 
number of questions in this assessment of prior knowledge was severely limited by the 
time the students had available for this study, as suggested by the participating institution. 
About 350 first- and second-year medical students from a midwestern medical 
school were invited to participate in this experiment. All efforts were made to ensure the 
participation of a minimum number of 88 subjects5.  
Research Questions 
Q1: Does the practice of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation 
technique affects, on average, learners’ performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
                                                
5 For a .06 medium effect size and .8 power for α = .05, a minimum of 44 subjects 
in each experimental group is recommended (Keppel, 1991, p. 72). 
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Q2: How does prior knowledge of relevant domains relate to the learners' 
performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
Q3: How does the use of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation 
technique influence participants' accounts of how and why they chose a certain answer or 
reach a certain solution? 
Assumptions and Clarifications 
• Considering a typical course schedule at the medical school where this 
research took take place, first-year medical students at the end of their second-
semester had already completed sufficient coursework to allow them to 
answer the questions included in this experiment. 
• Three domains in medicine: physiology, pathology and immunology are the 
most relevant areas for answering the questions included in this experiment's 
research instrument. 
• The medical profession relies extensively on causality and causal reasoning; 
therefore, students in the target group are assumed to be familiar with causally 
linked events and explanations. 
• Medical texts and literature use the term “mechanism” about processes that 
take place in the human body. The use of the term “mechanism” in this study 
and in materials presented to the participants is in accordance with its 
accepted meaning and use in the medical field. 
Summary 
Causal reasoning, a fundamental cognitive process, allows people to understand 
and use causality and to understand causally linked events (e.g., Rehder, 2003b) as they 
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try to “make sense” of the world (e.g., Hastie, 1984). Foundational to more complex 
forms of thinking and reasoning (Jonassen & Ionas, 2006), causal reasoning is required 
for drawing implications and inferences, making predictions and explaining phenomena 
in both everyday cognition and scientific thinking (e.g., Carey, 1995). 
While fundamental, understanding and using causality has been found to be 
difficult for people (e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Tversky & Cahneman, 1989). 
Research found that people have a tendency to simplify otherwise more complex causal 
structures (e.g., Bullock, et al., 1982; Perkins & Grotzer, 2000) as well as to resist 
changing existing schemas if they hold enough predictive power, even though their old 
schemas are no longer appropriate (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2006). In addition, while 
solving well-structured problems people tend to focus more on computations while 
missing the conceptual underpinnings.  
Understanding causality relies on people observing and processing at least two 
different kinds of information: covariational and mechanistic. Covariational information 
provides the probability of the cause producing the effect (e.g. Cheng & Novick, 1990), 
while mechanism information provides the “how” and the “why” of the causal process.  
With research showing that mechanism explanation is important for 
understanding causal relations (e.g. Lombrozo, 2007) and that people have problems 
understanding and using it, this study focuses on using self-explanation as a methodology 
to help people reason better in contexts where causal reasoning is needed. Localized in 
the medical field which relies heavily on causal reasoning, this study tries to find whether 
using self-explanation to elicit causal mechanism explanation improves, on average, 
people’s performance on tasks involving such reasoning processes.  
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Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyze the data provided 
by a completely randomized two-group between subjects experiment. To collect data on 
prior knowledge, performance and demographics, about 350 first- and second-year 
medical students from a Midwestern medical school were invited to participate. The 
expected outcome was for participants in atreatment group, who had a chance to practice 
self-explanation strategies by providing explanations for their choices on three multiple 
choice questions, to outperform participants in acontrol group, who did not have to 
provide explanations to the practice questions.
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Research in cognitive psychology shows evidence that people engage in causal 
reasoning to “make sense” of the world around them (Hastie, 1984; Shank & Abelson, 
1977). Since in the 18th century David Hume provided one of the most important 
contributions to the understanding of causality (Hume, 1739/1987) by showing that the 
idea of causation arises from the empirical relations of contiguity, temporal succession, 
and constant conjunction, a significant amount of research has aimed at understanding 
what causality is, how people reason causally, how they learn from causal events and 
process, or how they use their understanding of causality to diagnose past or predict 
future events. 
According to the majority of the scientific community, causality plays a 
fundamental role in the physical world and that causal reasoning, which is the human 
understanding of physical causality, is a fundamental part of human thinking (e.g., 
Thagard, 2000), an essential cognitive skill of higher order cognition (Carey, 1995; 
Schlottmann, 2001; Thagard, 2000), without which people would not be able to 
understand the world around them. Since David Hume focused mostly on the process of 
scientific discovery and less on everyday cognition, early work on causality, causal 
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reasoning, and causal understanding was mostly from the perspective of either the 
scientific research or the philosophy of science. 
For centuries, scholars have debated the meaning of causality but never reached 
common ground. Therefore, today there is no universally accepted definition of causality, 
although multiple attempts have been made over the years (for more details see Mooney 
Marini & Singer, 1988). Among them, David Hume (1987/1739) provided one of the 
most important contributions to the understanding of causality by showing that the idea 
of causation arises from the empirical relations of contiguity, temporal succession, and 
constant conjunction. 
Another important attribute of causality is its conjunctive plurality, which, in 
essence, represents the fact that an effect is rarely the result of a single cause (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1986; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). Scholars consider that two or more 
causes are usually involved in producing an effect and that all causes need to be 
concurrently present to produce the effect. On the other hand, the same scholars 
recognize the disjunctive plurality in causality, also known as “genuine multiple 
causation” when an effect is produced independently by any of the causes and the joint 
occurrence of two or more of the causes does not alter the effect. 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the notions of causality and causal reasoning are 
complex and have been approached by researchers and philosophers across the entire 
spectrum of human activities. While fundamental, causality and causal reasoning are also 
elusive concepts which are difficult to capture in research. For example, many scholars 
believe it is impossible to observe causality itself, but infer it from observable evidence, 
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such as the results (or effects) of the process (Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Hume, 
1739/1987; Young & Rogers, 2005). 
Cues to Causality and Causal Attribution 
Over the years scientists and philosophers observed that certain elements, such as 
contiguity and temporal order, have a tendency to indicate causal relationships (e.g. 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). However, there is no guarantee that the presence of these 
elements will make people perceive a relationship as causal. In principle, the existing 
literature agrees upon the following major types of cues to causality.  
Covariation between two variables is consistent with the traditional notion of 
cause. As the foundation for the covariational approach to causality, presented in more 
detail later in this chapter, covariation occurs when two objects are in constant 
conjunction with each other (Ahn & Kalish, 2000). It is also contended that covariation 
does not need to be perfect for people to recognize a causal relation (Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1986; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007). Waldmann (1996) shows that covariation data is more 
informative when used in combination with other assumptions about the system in which 
the causal relation takes place. 
Temporal order of succession has been found to be essential in determining which 
of the two variables that co-vary is the cause and which is the effect. Nevertheless, while 
the temporal order has a fundamental importance for causal judgments, it has no role in a 
formal probability theory (Beauchamp, 1974; Hume, 1739/1987; Mooney Marini & 
Singer, 1988). Temporal succession, related to the criterion of causal priority 
(asymmetry), requires a cause to be present for the effect to occur. Therefore, the 
common understanding of causality assumes that causes occur before their effects. 
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Lagnado et al. (2007), studying the interaction between temporal order, 
intervention, and covariational cues found that people use both temporal-order and 
interventional cues to infer causal structure. They also found that these cues dominate the 
available statistical information. Their research suggests that people might be using cues, 
such as temporal order, to generate initial models in order to test them later against 
covariational data.  
Conversely, the use of temporal succession as an indication of causality can be 
misleading, especially in the social sciences, since the temporal order in which the 
behavior occurs depends on the individual’s abilities to anticipate and plan the future. 
That is, temporal succession can be viewed as teleologically determined. As a result, 
causal priority is constructed in the mind in a way that is not reflected by the actual 
behavioral sequence (Mooney Marini & Singer, 1988). 
Contiguity in time and space plays an important role in directing people's 
attention to contingencies between variables (Michotte, 1946). Relying on these types of 
cues, causal inference becomes more difficult when temporal and/or spatial contiguity is 
low (erratic). Contiguity is particularly prone to conflict with other cues, which can in 
turn create the need for compromises. 
Research focused on the influence of time delay on how people judge causal 
strength shows that as the delay between two events increases, people judge the causal 
strength of the relationship to be weaker (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989). This 
holds unless people have reason to expect a delay between the cause and the effect 
(Buehner & May, 2002; Buehner & May, 2003; Bullock, et al., 1982; Hagmayer & 
Waldmann, 2002; Tangen & Allan, 2004). Replicating Shank's experiment Reed (1992, 
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1999) showed that people fail to identify causal relations if there is a more than two 
second delay between cause and effect. 
Considering that these findings are contrary to the richness of everyday cognition, 
where people seem to be able to recognize without effort causal relations that involve 
considerable delays, Buehner and May (2003) found that the impact of a temporal delay 
between cause and effect is largely dependent on the individual's expectations about the 
timeframe of the causal relation. Their study suggests that free-operand procedures used 
in previous studies, mainly based on animal behavior, are not well suited to study the 
direct influences of temporal delays on causal induction because they confound the delay 
with weaker evidence for the relationship being studied. 
Studying preschool children's causal assumptions about spatial contiguity and its 
use in learning new causal relations, Kushnir and Gopnik (2007) found that correct causal 
inferences were more likely to happen when causes were spatially close to each other, 
especially when the subject was facing ambiguous evidence. 
Similarity of cause and effect is, according to Nisbett and Ross (1980), a 
philosophically challenging concept which comes into play when people use, for 
example, the congruity of the length and strength of two variables, the cause and effect. 
That is, when the target effect is large in duration and magnitude, for example, people 
expect the cause(s) to be of comparable duration or magnitude. 
Using their own research as well as other prior experimental accounts, Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1986) summarize the characteristics of causal cues. First, the relation 
between each cue and the causal phenomenon is probabilistic. That is, while the cue 
might exist, the causal relation might not, and vice versa. Second, people use multiple 
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cues in their causal inferences as means to limit the extent of potential errors linked to 
inferring causality from single cues. Third, the use of multiple cues is often facilitated by 
redundancy, which reduces the negative effects of omitting cues as well as aids in 
focusing attention on others. Fourth, while multiple cues can reduce uncertainty, 
conflicting cues can increase it. 
Theories and Models of Causal Reasoning 
Initially the domain of philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, Hume, and Kant), theories on 
causal reasoning have evolved to fit one of two major groups, depending on how they 
combine the information about covariation and mechanisms (Griffith, 2005): (1) 
covariation based approaches and (2) mechanism-based approaches. Covariation-based 
approaches consider that human causal induction is due to a domain independent 
statistical sensitivity to covariation between cause and effect (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 
1992), while the mechanism-based approaches focus more on the role the knowledge 
about causal mechanisms plays in causal reasoning processes (e.g. Ahn & Kalish, 2000; 
L. E. Schultz & Griffith, 2007). The models in both approaches explain people's causal 
judgments, the difference between them being in the emphasis on information about 
covariation or mechanism. 
Covariation-Based Approaches 
The covariation-based approaches are successors of the Humean philosophy. 
They are based on the assumption that an event that exhibits a regularity of association 
with an effect (i.e., covaries with that effect) is more likely to be identified as a cause to 
that effect than an event that does not display such regularity of association. For example, 
based on this principle, the proponents of the contingency model of causal induction 
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(Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Salmon, 1989) argue that causal knowledge is derived from 
observable events and thus acquired from sensory input (Cheng, 1997). This approach 
remains the foundation for scientific inquiry ever since David Hume brought it to the 
attention of the scientific community in the late 1700s. 
The fundamental question for all these models is “How do people take advantage 
of regularities in their environment to induce causal relations and construct mental 
models based on them?” (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). The research has focused on using covariation as a major source of information to 
support causal relations. The general goal was to find a set of rules people use when they 
make causal inferences using a set of covarying events. 
Starting from the principle of covariation, Kelley (1967) thought of people as 
“intuitive scientists” who use a mechanism of causal induction similar to ANOVA 
(Analysis of Variance). He developed his ANOVA model in the context of studying causal 
attributions in interpersonal changes. Kelley's model proposes three dimensions, person 
(P), stimuli (S), and time/modalities (T) as independent variables. To measure consensus 
along theses three dimensions, Kelley proposes three information variables: consensus, 
distinctiveness and consistency. Causal attributions result from comparing the target 
event with other events along the three dimensions. According to this model, the 
configuration of these three information variables will determine if the effect will be 
attributed to a person, a stimuli or to a situation. Kelley's experiments (Kelley, 1967, 
1973), as well as later replications strongly support this model (see Ahn, et al., 1995for 
details). 
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Subsequent research on causal attribution found that Kelley's ANOVA model 
presents a number of issues such as (a) a bias against using consensus information, (b) 
people favoring personal attributions over stimulus and occasion attributions or (c) a 
tendency towards unpredicted, especially conjunctive, attributions (e.g. Joseph M. F. 
Jaspars, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In response to these issues, Cheng and Novick 
(1992) proposed their Probabilistic Contrast Model. Fundamentally, the model proposes 
that everyday causal inference is based on contrasts between various combinations of 
values and it is a probabilistic interpretation of the covariation principle. The model 
assumes that, for any situation, people have preexisting conceptions about potential 
causal factors, for which they compute covariations for situations in which the factors are 
present or absent. The final causal attribution is made if the proportion of events for 
which the effect occurs in the presence of the factors is noticeably different from the 
proportion of events for which the effect occurs in the absence of the factors (Ahn, et al., 
1995). In essence, the model is still based on covariation, but the covariation is expressed 
in probability terms that can be computed for any dimension, as opposed to purely 
through information variables.  
In mathematical terms, the probability of an effect occurring when the cause is 
present is represented by P(e|i) while the probability of the effect occurring when the cause 
is absent is represented by P(e|~i). Using this notation, causal roles are defined empirically 
using the following contingency rule: 
ΔPi = P(e|i) - P(e|~i) 
Considering the value obtained for ΔPi the following attributions can be made: (a) 
if ΔPi is positive, the candidate cause i is a facilitator in producing the effect, (b) if ΔPi is 
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negative, i is an inhibitor, while (c) when ΔPi is zero, i is a non-causal factor. In essence, 
the proponents of contingency type models claim that people are sensitive to the 
contingency ΔPi between the cause and the effect and that they use this information as a 
measure of causal strength or likelihood (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992). 
As a response to the same issues presented above, Jaspars et al. (1983) propose a 
deterministic interpretation of Kelley's ANOVA model that they called the Inductive 
Logic Model of causal attribution. According to this model, each piece of information 
given in an attribution problem is coded in terms of whether it involves (a) the individual 
in question or other people, (b) the stimulus in question or other stimuli and (c) the 
occasion in question or other occasions, while the presence or absence of the effect or 
behavior is noted. According to this model, people observe each potential causal factor or 
group of factors and note if it or they are present when the effect is present and absent 
when the effect is absent. In the end, they identify a factor or group of factors that is both 
necessary and sufficient for the effect to occur.  
Using the earlier Probabilistic Contrast Model (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) 
and using elements from the Causal Power Theory (Harre & Madden, 1975; P. A. White, 
1989), Cheng and Novick (1992) propose the Causal Strength Model6. While the causal 
strength model borrowed heavily from the earlier probabilistic contrast model, it was 
designed to emphasize the probabilistic nature of human causal reasoning. 
Later on, Cheng (1997) rejected ΔP as a measure of causal strength, considering it 
only a measure of covariation, but not causation (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 2005), 
because human judgments suggest assumptions about causality that are not purely 
                                                
6 In some works, Cheng's (1992) Causal Strength Model is alternatively called 
Causal Powers Model, which is different from Harre's (1985) Causal Power Theory. 
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covariational measures (e.g. ΔP) and conventional statistics. As a consequence, Cheng 
(1997) proposes what is today one of the most widely agreed upon theoretical 
frameworks, the Power PC Theory7, as an attempt to make these assumptions explicit. 
For that she proposes that human causal judgments correspond to “causal power”, the 
probability that the cause C produces the effect E in the absence of all other causes. 
Therefore, for a generative cause, the causal power can be estimated from contingency 
data as: 
power = ΔP/(1 - P(e+|c-)) 
In this case, the causal power takes ΔP as component and predicts that ΔP's effect 
will be greater when P(e+|c-) is large. Oppositely, for preventive causes, the causal power 
can be calculated using the formula below: 
power = - ΔP/P(e+|c-) 
According to this formula, for preventive causes, the smaller P(e+|c-) is, the greater 
ΔP's effect on the causal power. 
Another group of theories, in the same category with the covariation models, use 
direct acyclic graphs8 (DAGs) called Bayes networks to represent networks of causal 
relationships (Pearl, 1995, 2000). In this graphical representation, nodes represent 
variables of interest, such as the features of an object, and links represent causal 
inferences between these variables. The strength of a causal relation between two of the 
variables in the graph is represented by the conditional probability that is attached to each 
causal relation. In a sense, a Bayes network is closer to a model of the environment than 
                                                
7 Stands for “Causal Power Theory of the Probabilistic Contrast Model” 
8 Also named “influence diagrams” or “cause maps” by some authors, though the 
latter two have a wider application than the Bayes nets. 
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to other knowledge representation schemes (e.g., neural networks). These Bayes 
networks attempt to simulate how causal mechanisms operate in the environment. 
The inner workings of Bayes networks are based on a variety of inference 
algorithms. The first such mechanism for updating the probabilities in a Bayes network 
used a message-passing architecture (Pearl, 1998) and worked only on causal trees of 
singly connected networks. Since Pearl's first attempt, many other techniques have been 
developed to extend the tree propagation method to more general, multi-connected 
networks (Shachter, 1988). With roots in statistics, Bayes networks have recently started 
to be used in psychology research (Glymour, 2001; C. Glymour & P. Cheng, 1998; C. 
Glymour & P. W. Cheng, 1998; Gopnik, et al., 2004; Griffith & Tenenbaum, 2005; 
Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003). 
By using graphical means to represent probabilistic information and knowledge, 
Bayes networks are able to overcome many of the conceptual and computational 
difficulties of earlier knowledge based systems. Graphical models provide the means to 
maintain consistency and completeness in the context of working with probabilistic 
information and knowledge and to define modular procedures for knowledge acquisition 
that reduce the amount of work required. In addition, interdependencies can be dealt with 
explicitly (Pearl, 1998). Despite their utility, Bayes networks have an important 
limitation: they cannot include cycles, and therefore they allow for only an incomplete 
representation of certain events and processes (Mazlack, 2007). 
While popular, the covariational theories of causal reasoning have also raised 
criticisms among scholars, exposing a series of fundamental problems. For example, 
people can confidently infer a strong causal link between two events after only one 
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instance or co-occurrence of the cause and its effect (Beasly, 1968; Boyle, 1960; Read, 
1983). Also, well known in statistics, the fact that covariation does not imply causation is 
also an important criticism, together with the fact that these covariation-based models 
cannot explain the phenomenon. Other observed problems or issues are the discounting 
of causes when there is a difference in strength between alternate options (Goedert & 
Spellman, 2005) and the fact that the covariation-based models are not sensitive to the 
temporal aspects of causality. 
Mechanism-Based Approaches 
Historically speaking, the mechanism view to causal reasoning was probably 
brought by the research on category formation and causal learning (Buehner & Cheng, 
2005). While related, research in this area has not caught up with the research on 
covariation-based causal reasoning. Nevertheless, psychologists came to the consensus 
that the notion of causal mechanism is fundamental to people's concept of cause and 
causation (Ahn, et al., 1995; Bullock, et al., 1982; Cheng & Nisbett, 1993; L. E. Schultz 
& Griffith, 2007). The accepted interpretation is that the mechanism is the element that 
makes the difference between true causal relations and mere correlations or coincidences 
(Ahn & Kalish, 2000; Schlottmann, 2001). It is not the causal link in general that 
determines a correlation, but the mechanism underlying that causal link that produces it 
(Cheng, 1997; Maldonado, Catena, Perales, & Candido, 2007). It has been argued that 
people's ability to infer a causal relation is contingent upon knowledge of or insight in the 
causal mechanism that produces the effect given a candidate cause (Ahn, et al., 1995). In 
a series of studies about the way people combine causal mechanism9 information with 
                                                
9 For example, a network of intervening causal relations. 
 24 
 
covariation information Rapus (2004) found that the way the information about the 
strength of the covariation is used depends upon the level of detail of the mechanism 
information and the scope over which covariation information is derived. 
While it seems that there is no generally accepted definition of what a causal 
mechanism is, many scholars agree that the mechanism is the abstract, unobservable glue 
between observed events. That is, while physical systems could be analyzed at 
progressively finer levels, the mechanism, in its absolute sense, always eludes capturing 
(Schlottmann, 2001). In the same vein, Mazlack (2007) observes that while causal 
knowledge provides support for a deep understanding of a system and that potential 
control over a system comes from being able to predict its outcomes, knowledge of at 
least some of the relationships is inherently imprecise. He also observes that usually, 
commonsense causal reasoning is more successful in reasoning about a few large-grained 
events than about many finer-grained ones. That is, simplicity (or simplification) helps 
causal reasoning, but larger-grained causal objects are by definition more imprecise. 
A mechanism explains how a phenomenon is produced (Machamer, Darden, & 
Craver, 2000), how tasks are carried out (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993), or how the 
mechanism as a whole behaves (Glennan, 1996). Hobbs (2001) looks at mechanisms as 
“causal complexes10”, a collection of events which produces an effect by their occurrence 
or non-occurrence. Similarly, Glennan (2005) considers the mechanism a complex 
system that produces a behavior through the interaction of its component parts, where the 
interactions between parts can be characterized by “direct, invariant, change related 
generalizations”. 
                                                
10 A causal complex is the complete set of events and conditions necessary for the 
causal effect to occur (Hobbs, 2001). 
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Mechanisms are also characterized as “entities and activities organized such that 
they are productive of regular changes from start or setup to finish, or termination 
conditions” (Machamer, et al., 2000). In one of these views, mechanisms are seen as 
regular because they usually work or behave in the same way under the same conditions. 
This regularity is present in the way the mechanism (process) runs from the beginning to 
the end, but what makes it regular is the productive continuity between stages (Darden, 
2002). In another view, activities are producers or enablers of change, while entities are 
the “things” that engage in these activities. That is, in this view, entities and activities are 
interdependent. From another perspective, Thagard (2000) showed that inferring a causal 
relation is not contingent on knowledge about a causal mechanism, but is enhanced by it.  
The mechanism approach differs from the traditional covariational approaches in 
at least two important aspects: 
• It involves different types of information seeking behavior, by asking “how?” 
rather than “what?” questions; 
• It requires the individual to use prior knowledge to reach a conclusion. 
The mechanism-based approaches to causal reasoning seem to be more 
cognitively complex than their covariation-based counterparts (Hung, 2004). A claim 
scholars make about the mechanism-based approaches relies on the fact that the 
mechanism resides on a different cognitive level than the cause and the effect, a level that 
is removed from the concrete conditions of the underlying evidential phenomena. 
Removing the mechanism from its concrete context creates the premises for mechanism 
reuse in other contexts (Kitcher, 1989; Salmon, 1984). As Ahn and his colleagues (1995) 
suggest, when seeking the cause of an event, individuals primarily try to discover the 
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processes or mechanisms underlying the relationship between the cause and the effect. In 
expressing a causal relationship, for example, explaining an accident, the mechanism 
approach would argue that people would seek explanations that go above and beyond the 
relationships that are at the level or the target effect. That is, causal explanations would 
seek to involve a new set of theoretical entities – theories or processes not present in the 
event description. 
It is known that highly complex systems, such as a living cell, organism, or an 
organization have many concurrent mechanisms working at any given time. That is, they 
undergo several intertwined processes, at the same time, both on the same level and on 
different levels. The coexistence of parallel mechanisms is especially noticeable in bio- 
and social systems. As a result, because more than one mechanism may be at work at any 
given time in the same system, distinguishing between essential and non essential 
mechanisms may be necessary. Therefore, scholars proposed various frameworks to deal 
with such complexity (Glennan, 2002; Machamer, et al., 2000; Railton, 1978; Salmon, 
1984, 1989). Elaborating on Railton’s (1978) work on causal-mechanical explanation, 
Salmon (1984, 1989) proposes a concept of what he calls “causal nexus”, which he 
considers to be a vast network of interacting causal processes. Alternatively, borrowing 
from general systems theory, other scholars propose a complex-system approach to 
mechanisms (Glennan, 2002), rooted in the work of Wismatt and Herbert Simon. As 
Glennan proposes: 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces 
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the 
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interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, 
change-related generalizations (Glennan, 2002, p. S344). 
Similarly, Glennan (2005) discusses the relationship between mechanisms and 
people's models of these mechanisms. His research shows that there is no Baconian 
crucial experiment to decide between competing models.  
From a mainly cognitive perspective, Machamer et al. (2002) consider 
mechanisms a way to explain how phenomena are produced. Taking an action oriented 
perspective, Bechtel and Richardson (1993) think of mechanisms as the way tasks are 
carried out. Thus mechanisms “are entities and activities organized in such a way that 
they are productive of regular changes from start or setup to finish or termination 
conditions.” (Darden, 2002, p. S356) 
In understanding and explaining human behavior, Budesheim (1998) suggests 
that, when exemplars of an individual's behavior are readily available, they will be used 
before using abstract knowledge if the participants were motivated to engage in effortful 
processing. This finding suggests that when no effort is required, such as in the case of 
everyday cognition, people display a tendency to use exemplars they already processed 
rather than fundamental knowledge. That is, motivation seems to play an important role 
in what kind of information and reasoning processes people use. 
Problems and Issues with Causal Reasoning and Understanding in Humans 
From very early on scholars observed that people have problems dealing with 
causality and causal relationships. Empirical work spanning many years shows that 
people have problems when reasoning about causes (Chapman & Chapman, 1969; 
Shanks, Medin, & Holyoak, 1996; Sperber, Premack, & Premack, 1995)
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the work of Chapman and Chapman (1969) suggests that people's misunderstanding of 
causality can result in creating spurious correlations. Pennington and Hasties (1988) 
suggest that people who do not understand correctly the causality of a phenomenon 
weigh the same evidence differently, while Tversky and Cahneman (1989) suggest that 
people reach incorrect conclusions about conditional probabilities. 
In their research Schustack and Sternberg (1981) also show a number of such 
issues. They observed that people tend to favor confirming rather than disconfirming 
information. That is, people tend to associate more importance to information that 
confirms their personal theories versus information that disproves them. They tend to 
“overreact” to negatively presented evidence versus positively presented evidence. That 
is, there seems to be a strong emotional component to causal reasoning that in certain 
situations hinders people's ability to reason causally. The same research also shows that 
people tend to focus too much on the cause to be evaluated to the detriment of other 
sources of information available to them. In other words, people seem to have a difficulty 
observing a causal network. They also tend to emphasize the information source at hand 
versus the environment of which the information source is part. 
Another growing body of research (Chi, 2000a; Driver, et al., 1985; Perkins & 
Grotzer, 2000; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999) supports the findings that people have 
problems when dealing with causality when engaged in learning activities. It suggests 
that students have limited notions about the nature of the cause and the effect. A number 
of studies in ecology (Bell-Basca, Grotzer, Donis, & Shaw, 2000; Green, 1997) show that 
students' causal reasoning does not correspond to that of scientists. This finding has also 
been documented in other areas, such as electricity (e.g. Grotzer, 2000; Shipstone, 1985), 
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ecosystems (e.g. Green, 1997), and force and motion in physics (Halloun & Hestenes, 
1985; B. Y. White & Frederiksen, 1995). 
For example, in studying pressure (Bell-Basca & Grotzer, 2001), when 
determining the causes of pressure-related events, students tend to reason using obvious 
variables rather than considering non-obvious ones. They tend to overlook the systemic 
nature of a pressure related event and think linearly. In addition, for many students, 
pressure is unidirectional rather than omnidirectional. These findings are supported by 
earlier studies (Grotzer & Bell, 1999) which show that students expect obvious causes 
and effects while often missing effects that involve systems in equilibrium or those that 
involve passive agents. In other words, students tend to expect obvious causal 
relationships. Other research (Spelke, et al., 1996) suggests that while students are good 
at recognizing local or localized relationships, they have difficulties recognizing actions 
at a distance, either spatial or temporal. This suggests the difficulties in observing causal 
structures of phenomena.  
A study by Anat and Pinchas (1991) in biology shows that student have two main 
difficulties when attempting to understand causal relationships: 1) inability to organize 
events according to their correct temporal sequence and 2) inability to identify an event 
which had been caused by another (given) event.  
Research suggests that students tend to assume that the causal patterns they come 
across are simple, linear and sequential, and in which temporal priority is predominantly 
visible, linking the causes with their effects (Bullock, et al., 1982). For example, in 
physics, Barbas and Psillos (1997) show that in studying electricity students tend to think 
linearly, indicating difficulties in understanding of omni-propagation of disturbances in 
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electrical circuits. Their study also shows a lack of association between the qualitative 
description (for variables at the macroscopic level) and underlying microscopic models. 
In physics education, Besson (2004) shows that students often confuse conditions with 
actual causes (efficient with contingent causes), that they have difficulties connecting 
local causes to global effects and that they show a tendency to skip intermediate 
objects11. Grotzer (2000) shows that students’ explanations tend to be simple, linear 
models whereas scientific explanation involves analyzing cause as part of a relation or an 
interaction. The same study suggests that the type of causality underlying students’ 
models tends to be simple, conductive for simplified interpretations of the information in 
complex models12.  
In a research paper reporting on the “Understanding the Consequences (UC) 
Project,” Grotzer (2003) shows that exposing students to the underlying causality of 
phenomena through specifically designed activities and engaging them in discussions 
about this causality helps them outperform students who learn the same topics, but 
without these features. These findings held across a range of ages and topics, such as 
electricity, ecosystems, density and air pressure.  
In a qualitative, phenomenographic study, Fyrenius et al. (2007) show that 
students display frequent misconceptions about underlying principles in medical 
physiology. He suggests that while causal reasoning is often rewarded in examinations, 
very long and complex causal relations can be rote memorized instead of understood. 
These findings are also supported by Dahlgren (1997), who shows that college education 
                                                
11 To “displace” causes, either skipping intermediate objects, or merging them 
into a larger one. 
12 Simplified models can be useful in many aspects of everyday life, but they can 
also distort the scientific interpretation to the extent when it becomes unusable. 
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will affect students’ acquisition of terminology and of problem solving algorithms, but it 
is rarely able to affect the understanding of central phenomena. Support is also provided 
by Patel et al. (1989) who show that students often inconsistently apply causal rules 
based on science information. Their study showed a prevalence of superficial 
identification of concepts in novices, when more experienced students were able to use 
general laws. Surveying teachers of physiology about sources of students’ difficulties in 
learning the discipline, Michael (2007) found three main problems. First is that the nature 
of the discipline, which requires causal reasoning, uses graphs and mathematics, and is 
highly interactive. Second is the way the discipline is taught. The third is related to what 
students bring to the task of learning physiology: their belief that learning and 
memorization is the same thing, their inability or lack of willingness to integrate, and 
their tendency to compartmentalize. 
Indirectly linked to people’s difficulties with understanding causal relationships is 
Waldmann and Hagmayer’s (2006) finding that people show a strong tendency to use old 
conceptual schemas rather than switch to new ones even if and when old categories are 
no longer appropriate for predicting the new effect. That is, people tend to show 
resistance to change when updating their causal mental models is needed. Therefore, 
research suggests that without the necessary expert structural knowledge and a reflective 
sense of where it applies, students risk imposing limiting structures on new information, 
which ends up in distorting their own understanding to fit a usually less complex causal 
structure (Grotzer, 2000; Slotta & Chi, 1999; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999). 
 32 
 
Explanation and Self-Explanation 
While overlooked and underused (Strobel, et al., 2008), the explanation of the 
causal phenomenon plays an important part in the understanding of causal relations (e.g. 
Lombrozo, 2007; Slusher & Anderson, 1996; Van Fraassen, 1985). Also, as Ahn’s (1995) 
work suggests, seeking causal mechanisms (or explanations) seems to be an innate trait 
people have, as this behavior looks to be “natural”. According to the Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mayes, 2005), historically, the concept of explanation has 
been associated with causation. That is, to explain an event or phenomenon is to identify 
its cause in one of two ways: realist or epistemic. The realist explanation is a literal 
description of reality while the epistemic explanation holds that the role of explanation is 
to facilitate construction of a consistent empirical model and not to replicate reality. By 
emphasizing the reason for which things happen, explanation goes beyond mere 
description, and from a learning perspective, it holds a special place as one of the six core 
critical thinking skills13 (Irani, 2006).  
Looking at explanations Slusher & Anderson (1996) found that explanation 
availability is a mediator for the change in beliefs when causal arguments are involved. In 
other words, asking for an explanation improves the probability for an individual to 
understand the problem s/he is facing. Studying the role of simplicity and probability in 
evaluating causal explanations, Lombrozo (2007) found that explanations seem to be 
used by people as foundation for further estimates (e.g., probability of occurrence). 
Besson’s (2004) study in physics education suggests that to really understand a physical 
phenomenon people tend to need an explanation to account for the dynamics of that 
                                                
13 As defined by the Delphi study on critical thinking. 
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particular phenomenon. From the scientists’ point of view Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
(2005) suggest that an explanation in a causal context usually employs multiple forms of 
representation by including, for example, both graphical and textual presentations. 
While important, the general domain of explanation is too broad for the purpose 
of this study. Because the experiment is built using tasks the participants will be 
performing alone, by themselves, the concept of self-explanation (e.g., Chi, et al., 1989) 
seems to be better suited. The term self-explanation or self-generated explanation (Chi, et 
al., 1989) refers to the explanations a learner generates on his or her own as opposed to 
the explanations provided by an external source (i.e., instructor, book, etc.). Reported 
gains in science education attributed to the use of self-explanation are overwhelming, 
with self-explainers often performing twice as well as the non-self-explainers (Kastens & 
Liben, 2007). Self-explanations are usually more effective than the explanations provided 
by others because (a) they require students to actively elaborate their prior knowledge, 
thus triggering more constructive learning processes, (b) they are usually very well 
targeted toward the student’s specific problem, and (c) they are available at the time and 
place of the learner’s need.  
Acknowledging that many studies show only that learning and self-explanation 
co-occur, VanLehn & Jones (1993) propose three possible explanations for why self-
explanation works. First, self-explanation seems to motivate learners to detect and fill 
gaps in their domain knowledge. Second, it seems to help learners abstract solutions and 
procedures from the current context to a more general description of the problem. And 
third, self-explanation seems to induce what is called “an analogical enhancement,” that 
is, a richer elaboration of the example or case which facilitates later analogical problem 
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solving. In their study, the authors found that gap-filling seems to produce most 
enhancements in learning. Lombrozo (2006) shows that engaging in self-explanation can 
affect the probability assigned to causal claims, the way probabilities are generalized and 
learning in general. The reason behind his findings seems to be the fact that explanations 
accommodate novel information in the context of prior knowledge while doing this in a 
way that fosters generalization. He finds that even for complex domains, self-explanation 
is more effective at improving learning and generalization than reading text or receiving 
feedback. 
In a study of fifth-graders learning mathematical equivalence, Rittle-Johnson 
(2006) found that self-explanation facilitated learning the correct procedures, allowed for 
these procedures to be adapted to solving novel problems, and boosted procedure 
retention over time. The study found that children who did not explain had a tendency to 
revert to old, incorrect procedures. Three mechanisms by which self-explanation helps 
learning were suggested: a) helped with invention of new problem-solving approaches, b) 
broadened the range of problems to which children applied correct procedures accurately 
and c) supported procedure adaptation to solving novel problems in situations when rote 
application of a known procedure was not possible.  
So far, researchers report mostly positive effects when learners use strategies 
based on self-explanation for a wide variety of topics and learning situations. For 
example, Chi and her colleagues (1994) show that self-explanation can improve learning 
when used for learning declarative knowledge from a text. Using a text on the human 
body circulatory system Chi showed that high explainers (learners who generate a large 
number of self-explanation statements) had greater understanding of the subject than low 
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explainers. In her study, all high explainers constructed the correct mental model, while 
many of the students in the control group as well as the low explainers did not. Exploring 
the impact of different prompts to students’ learning from a text on evolutionary biology, 
Coleman, Brown and Rivkin (1997) showed that the students who were instructed to 
explain performed better than those who were instructed to summarize or listen to 
another student’s explanation or summary. The performance increase was strong for both 
near and far transfer tasks.  
For learning from text, a study by Kintsch (1994) suggests that difficulties in 
reading text might be more conducive to learning when prior knowledge of the domain is 
adequate. The study suggests that for many the reading process can be too easy, without 
engaging learners in deep reasoning processes. In these situations strategies for active 
reading, of which self-explanation seems to be particularly successful, can be supportive 
for activities that are more constructive and thus improve learning outcomes. Further 
studies (Ainsworth & Burcham, 2007) show that in reading, self-explanation serves 
different purposes, depending on the quality of the text. For less coherent texts, self-
explanation seems to only help compensate for weaknesses and gaps in the text, while for 
highly coherent texts it seems to lead learners to detect and repair flaws in their mental 
models. This research leads to the conclusion that self-explanation is effective when 
learners use well-structured and explicit texts. A recent study (Yeh, Chen, Hung, & 
Hwang, 2009) found that the effect of self-explanation prompts on learning depends on 
the learner’s prior knowledge of the domain. For learners with high prior knowledge, 
prediction-based prompts seem to work best whereas for learners with low prior 
knowledge, prompts related to reasoning seem to work better. 
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In the same vein, Bielaczyc et al. (1995) show that self-explanation is a strategy 
most high-performance students use, for example when linking current concepts with 
prior knowledge. In his study, the effectiveness of the strategy depends on the learners’ 
domain-general and domain-specific knowledge, the comprehensiveness of the problem 
being studied as well as the state of students’ evolving understanding.  
A study by Kirschner, Sweller & Clark (2006) on the advantages and 
disadvantages of using guidance during instruction shows that the advantage of external 
guidance diminishes only when learners have sufficient prior knowledge to be able to 
provide guidance for themselves. That is, for learners with low levels of prior knowledge 
of a domain, constructivist approaches are not as effective. Both assisting and open 
prompts have been found to foster both principle-based and rationale-based self-
explanation (Berthold, Eysink, & Renkl, 2009). Assisting self-explanation prompts seem 
to have additional value when compared to open prompts, especially for integrating 
multiple perspectives, but they come at a cost: they are time consuming. 
Looking from the perspective of individual differences, Renkl (1997) shows that 
successful learners tend to employ more principle-based explanations, explicate the 
operator-goal combination and use anticipative reasoning. In other words, they assign 
meaning by identifying underlying domain principles, by identifying goals and sub-goals 
and exhibit a tendency to anticipate the next step in the solution instead of looking it up. 
The same study shows that less successful learners use more metacognitive monitoring, 
that is, they explain a greater number of comprehension problems, indicating a 
metacognitive awareness of their learning own difficulties. 
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While performance increases were strong in most of the situations, a study by 
Pirolli & Recker (1994) on the impact of self-explanation on computer programming 
skills suggests that while effective, more self-explanation may not necessarily be better. 
That is, they believe in the law of diminishing returns when using self-explanation based 
strategies. Pirolly & Recker consider that there are only a limited number of possibilities 
one can elaborate on a given text or problem until it becomes repetitive. Their research 
seems to point to the fact that while further pursuit of self-explanations might increase 
comprehension, it might not be worth the cost in terms of time and effort spent on task. 
Further studies on problem solving in physics (Chi & Bassok, 1989), computer 
programming (Pirolli & Recker, 1994), learning chess (De Bruin, Rikers, & Schmidt, 
2007), or even emotion understanding (Tenenbaum, Alfieri, Brooks, & Dunne, 2008) 
show the effectiveness of self-explanation based strategies. The existing evidence seems 
to suggest that self-explanation is a domain independent strategy which, once learned, 
can be successfully used outside the domain in which it was first acquired. Other studies 
which support this conclusion investigate spreadsheet use in accountancy (Reinmann & 
Neubert, 2000), experimental design (Lin & Lehmann, 1999) and reading maps (Kastens 
& Liben, 2007). Looking at self-explanation as a domain independent strategy, Nathan et 
al. (1994) found that it works better for conceptual reasoning while providing only 
marginal advantage for procedural contexts. He also noted a decrease in performance 
when cognitive load is significant, a situation that suggests the existence of a competition 
for cognitive resources. 
Studies show that self-explanation has significant positive impact on performance 
either when it is presented to others by speaking aloud, or when it happens in one’s head 
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(e.g. Didierjean & Cauzinille-Marmèche, 1997). Both writing or typing self-explanations 
supports performance improvements, as a study by Aleven & Koedinger (2002) suggests. 
Researchers also documented the fact that self-explanation based strategies help both 
when feedback on the correctness of the explanation is provided (Aleven & Koedinger, 
2002) and when it is not (Chi, et al., 1989; Chi, et al., 1994). Research also shows that 
either guiding (e.g. Bielaczyc, et al., 1995) or prompting (Chi, et al., 1994) people to self-
explain improves performance.  
A significant body of research (e.g. Crippen & Earl, 2007; Mitchell, Mertz, & 
Ryan, 1994) is interested in using worked examples associated with explanations and 
self-explanations to support learning. This research shows that good problem solvers tend 
to engage in more self-directed elaboration than poor problem solvers when studying 
worked-out examples in physics (Mitchell, et al., 1994), and that instructional 
explanations are mainly requested by learners with a low level of prior knowledge 
(Renkl, 2002). Another study (Atkinson, et al., 2003) found that fading of worked-out 
examples improves performance on near-transfer tasks, but does not have a reliable effect 
on far-transfer tasks. The same study shows that including prompts to help self-
explanation (such as asking for identification of the principle or mechanism) supports 
medium to large effects in both near- and far-transfer tasks, with no additional time on 
task. A more recent study (Crippen & Earl, 2007) shows that a combination of worked-
out examples and self-explanation prompts produces improvements in performance, 
problem solving skill and self-efficacy. If the same worked-out examples are being used 
without prompting, the intuitive sense learners might have about how to use the examples 
does not always work. 
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Self-explanation was studied in the context of gap-detection and gap-filling (Chi 
& Bassok, 1989; Lin & Lehmann, 1999; VanLehn, Jones, & Chi, 1992), mental model 
revision (DeLeeuw & Chi, 2003), conflict detection and resolution during knowledge 
integration (Chi, et al., 1994), thought organization (Lin & Lehmann, 1999) and error 
detection and self-correction (Kastens & Liben, 2007). By construct, scholars have 
looked at schema formation and case-based reasoning (Didierjean & Cauzinille-
Marmèche, 1997), analogical enhancement (Reinmann & Neubert, 2000), visual/verbal 
integration (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002), construction of new knowledge (Chi, et al., 
1989; DeLeeuw & Chi, 2003; VanLehn, et al., 1992; Wong & Lawson, 2002), connection 
of principles to action (Lin & Lehmann, 1999), and situational model building (Kintsch, 
1994). Self-explanation seems to be a versatile strategy that can be implemented in a 
variety of learning contexts, both in face-to-face and online environments.  
Summary 
As one of the fundamental cognitive processes, causal reasoning and the 
associated causality have both received constant attention over the years. Initiated by 
David Hume in the 1700s, causality and causal reasoning have been studied by scholars 
from a variety of backgrounds and perspectives (Bunge, 2004; Cheng, 1997; Fugeslang & 
Thompson, 2000; Fyrenius, et al., 2007; Grotzer, 2003). 
In the past, a covariational, statistics-based view on causality has emerged and 
received most of the attention of the scientific community (e.g., Ahn & Kalish, 2000; 
Anderson, 1990; Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1990). While historically present, in 
recent years the mechanistic view on causality has been revitalized (Darden, 2002; 
Glennan, 1996, 2002; Machamer, et al., 2000). Although the two views on causality were 
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for some time considered somehow parallel approaches to the same domain, in recent 
years scholars have begun to come to a common understanding that the two are more or 
less complementary, with the covariational approach providing the hard data to the 
mechanistic approach, which in turn, provides the power of causal models (e.g., Axelrod, 
1976; C. Glymour & P. W. Cheng, 1998; Huff & Jenkins, 2002). This more recent 
research suggests that the causes and their effects are facts and that the causal 
mechanisms or processes that link them, when explained, reside on a higher cognitive 
level (e.g., Ahn & Baileson, 1996; Kitcher, 1989; Salmon, 1984). 
While some scholars have studied the nature of causality and the associated causal 
reasoning processes, others have taken a different route and have looked at how people 
use causality in learning, work and everyday life. Spanning many years, this research 
(e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Pennington & Hasties, 1988; Shanks, et al., 1996; 
Sperber, et al., 1995; Tversky & Cahneman, 1989) shows some troublesome findings in 
that people have problems dealing with causality and causally linked events. The same 
research tends to suggest that this trend is more important for learners as students have a 
tendency to favor obvious, localized, simple, linear, and sequential causal relations (e.g. 
Bullock, et al., 1982; Chi, 2000a; Driver, et al., 1985; Grotzer & Bell, 1999; Perkins & 
Grotzer, 2000; Spelke, et al., 1996; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999). These findings suggest 
that students have a tendency to simplify the otherwise more complex causal structure – a 
process that results in a distorted understanding. 
Finally, the construct of self-explanation (e.g., Chi, et al., 1989; Chi, et al., 1994; 
Conati & VanLehn, 2000; DeLeeuw & Chi, 2003) has the potential to help people 
improve their causal reasoning skills, as research reports significant gains in performance 
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on task for people using self-explanation strategies compared to people that do not (e.g. 
Kastens & Liben, 2007). Studied in different contexts and for varied age groups, self-
explanation seems to be a domain-independent strategy (Nathan, et al., 1994) that most 
high-performance students use (Bielaczyc, et al., 1995) in linking prior knowledge to 
current content. It has also been shown that either guiding (e.g. Bielaczyc, et al., 1995) or 
prompting (Chi, et al., 1994) people to self-explain improves performance. 
What brings all this research together is its potential to inform a new approach to 
using causality in learning. It is possible that people’s problems with causal reasoning 
that research unveiled could be diminished by asking learners to overtly explicate the 
causal mechanism(s) when describing or working on a causal relationship. Stated 
differently, by requiring learners to explain (self-explain) causal mechanisms, they will 
be forced to recall, use, evaluate and eventually reevaluate their mental models to fit the 
current situation. By requesting learners to overtly explain the causal mechanism(s) that 
link the causes and their effects, learners will be actively influenced to exert more 
cognitive effort, which has the potential to significantly improve their performance in 
present and future causal reasoning tasks.
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CHAPTER 3: Methods 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this study is to determine if the practice of self-explanation 
as causal mechanism elicitation technique affects learners’ performance on causal 
reasoning tasks. Therefore, the methodology used in this study was developed to make 
possible the observation of the effects of using self-explanation based cognitive strategies 
while attempting to maintain all other factors constant. To achieve this goal, this study 
was conducted as an experiment with two groups: control and treatment.  
Research Questions 
The research questions this study attempts to answer are: 
Q1: Does the practice of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation 
technique affects, on average, learners’ performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
Q2: How does prior knowledge of relevant domains relate to the learners' 
performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
Q3: How does the use of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation 
technique influence participants' accounts of how and why they chose a certain answer or 
reach a certain solution? 
Experiment Design 
To address the requirements of this study a two-group, between subjects, 
completely randomized, experimental design was chosen. It is a between subjects design 
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because a subject is member of only one of the two experiment groups: control or 
treatment (Keppel, 1991, p. 19). It is also a completely randomized design since the 
participants were randomly assigned to one and only one of the two experimental groups 
(Keppel, 1991, p. 18). Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. The 
quantitative data were collected to study the impact of the treatment, the use of self-
explanation, on the participants’ performance on a transfer causal reasoning task. The 
qualitative data were collected to better understand how participants reason causally in 
the given context. 
The design of this experiment is based on existing literature and two pilot studies 
which were conducted with the intent to help the development of this research 
methodology. In the first pilot study, a pairing task for reconstructing an influence 
diagram from a scenario proved to be too complex and cognitively demanding14 for the 
participants, as evidenced by many participants exiting the experiment early15. The 
second pilot study simplified the task by only asking the participants to explain the 
mechanisms that support the functioning of everyday things and phenomena16. While in 
this second case the task was simple enough for most of the participants to complete, the 
results were mixed. A qualitative analysis of the participants’ answers suggests two 
conclusions: (1) the subject or topic was of no importance for the participants and (2) for 
everyday things, mechanisms or processes, people build very strong conceptual models 
                                                
14 The participants in the treatment group had to work through 4,060 
combinations of causes, mechanisms, and effects, while the participants in the control 
group had to consider only 153 combinations of causes and effects. 
15 Of the 62 participants that answered the invitation, only 22 took the experiment 
to its conclusion while providing usable data points. 
16 The first scenario was about using a thermostat (house heating system) while 
the second scenario was about water evaporation (drying clothes).  
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they will not question or revise if the they do not have powerful enough incentives to do 
so, which the study did not provide. Also, it appeared that the participants did not even 
use these conceptual models, but relied only on learned outcomes, effects, or behaviors 
for everyday use purposes. 
Building on the findings of these two pilot studies, the decision was made to 
ground this study in a domain in which causal reasoning is important for performance and 
in which incentives are high in order to motivate participants to reassess their mental 
models. This requirement lead to the selection of medicine as the general field, as 
physicians as well as medical students rely heavily on understanding causality and 
therefore on using causal reasoning. An added benefit of selecting this field is that causal 
mechanisms are present throughout the curriculum, making it possible to circumvent the 
need for training the participants in how to use and explain the mechanisms. 
Focusing on the medical field, the next step was to select a topic around which to 
develop the elements of the research instrument. Because causal relationships in medicine 
can be very complex and involve many body systems, the specific topic chosen for this 
study had to be of average complexity, fairly well bounded, with clear, recognizable 
causal relationships. Consultations with a subject matter expert (SME) lead to choosing 
the more general area of immune responses, with focus a on asthma for the specific 
performance assessment. The decision to use the chosen topic was also determined by 
who the potential participants were. The targeted group consisted of second year medical 
students at a midwestern medical school.  
The possibility of a small rate of participation among the 175 second-year medical 
students required the inclusion of first-year medical students as well, since students who, 
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at the time of the experiment (the end of the first year) should have had at least partial 
knowledge to allow them to approach the problem. Because differences in knowledge are 
expected between the first and second year medical students, any further quantitative 
analysis controlled for the influence of the year of study by including it as a covariate or 
control variable when appropriate. 
Designing the specific items of an instrument for performance assessment as a 
transfer task required a decision about how the self-explanation treatment was to be 
delivered. Knowing that people can be trained in self-explanation (e.g. Wong & Lawson, 
2002), a protocol adapted from Atkinson et. al. (2003), who used prompts to encourage 
learners to identify the underlying principle while solving practice problems, was 
developed for this research. To design the practice activities, a task familiar to the 
participants was chosen: multiple-choice questions. Associated with the multiple-choice 
questions received by all participants, the practice designed for the treatment group 
consisted of prompting them to answer an open-ended question about the mechanisms 
that are at work in the brief scenario presented to them in the problem definition. Because 
multiple-choice questions are familiar to medical students, as many of their examinations 
use multiple-choice questions based on causal scenarios, the task was expected to be 
simple enough that cognitive overload would not occur. 
The treatment spans three multiple-choice questions similar to those which 
medical students encounter in their tests or board examinations. The participants in the 
control group were asked to answer the questions by selecting one of the choices 
presented to them as answers, as they would do during a test. The treatment designed for 
this experiment was to prompt the participants to practice self-explanation over the same 
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three multiple-choice questions. Therefore, the participants in the treatment group were 
asked to first explain what mechanisms or processes were at play before selecting an 
answer. One of the practice questions is presented in Table 1 as it is presented to the 
control and treatment groups 
Table 1 
Practice problems for control and treatment groups 
Control group Treatment group 
A 10-year-old child presents with a 
persistent sinus infection. Over the course 
of the last 5 years, the patient has had 
several dozen sinus and upper respiratory 
infections. Blood tests reveal abnormally 
low levels of IgA immunoglobulin, but 
normal levels of other isotypes. 
 
The patient’s recurring infections are most 
likely due to a defect in which of the 
following? 
 
a) Fixation of complement 
b) Mast cell activation 
c) Mucosal immunity 
d) Neutrophil activation 
e) Opsonization of bacteria 
A 10-year-old child presents with a 
persistent sinus infection. Over the course 
of the last 5 years, the patient has had 
several dozen sinus and upper respiratory 
infections. Blood tests reveal abnormally 
low levels of IgA immunoglobulin, but 
normal levels of other isotypes. 
 
What mechanisms are most probable to be 
at play in this case? 
__________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
__________________________________ 
 
The patient’s recurring infections are most 
likely due to a defect in which of the 
following? 
 
a) Fixation of complement 
b) Mast cell activation 
c) Mucosal immunity 
d) Neutrophil activation 
e) Opsonization of bacteria 
 
The final step in designing this experiment, besides developing the research 
instrument, presented below, was to decide upon what other elements the research should 
include. Since prior knowledge is considered to be important for both causal reasoning 
and self-explanation, this study includes a section designed to assess participants’ prior 
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knowledge in the fields related to the performance assessment question. In addition, it 
was considered important to collect the participant intended medical specialty among 
other demographic data as this could be relevant to the subject’s performance since s/he 
might have invested more effort toward that specialty.  
Research Instrument 
Within the overall experiment design, the specific instrument designed for this 
study and the rationale for the inclusion of each of the components is outlined in Table 2. 
A workflow of the instrument can be found in Appendix 2 while the full-length 
instrument is presented in Appendix 3. 
Table 2 
Structure of the research instrument 
Assessment of prior knowledge 
Located at the beginning of the instrument so that it is not biased by any of the other 
instrument items. It is composed of two different measures, intended to provide an assessment 
in three areas: physiology, pathology, and immunology, all playing a role in answering the 
performance question in the transfer task. 
Self-rating Self-rating of prior knowledge in three domains. Positioned at the 
very beginning so that it is not biased by how the participants perceive 
their performance on subsequent tasks. 
Multiple-choice 
assessment 
Set of six multiple choice questions designed to provide a brief 
assessment of prior knowledge of the domain. There are two questions 
per area, half having multiple answers (check all that apply). The 
questions were adapted from similar questions found in standardized 
tests medical students take for their board examinations. Examples of 
assessment questions are presented below this table. 
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Practice (treatment) 
 
A set of three multiple-choice questions. Both groups, control and treatment, were asked to 
answer these questions. The difference between the control and treatment group was that, 
together with answering each question, the participants in the treatment group were prompted 
to explain the mechanisms that they think are at work in the presented scenario. The questions 
were adapted from similar questions found in standardized tests. An example is presented in 
Table 1. 
Performance assessment (transfer task) 
Multiple-choice 
question 
One multiple-choice question, developed together with the subject 
matter expert based on an influence diagram representing the main 
physiological and immunological causal relations in an asthma attack, 
also developed together with the subject matter expert. The question 
has only one correct answer among the presented choices. 
Mechanism 
explanation 
The participant was asked to explain the mechanisms that support his 
or her choice of the answer.  
Self-confidence 
question 
The participant was asked to rate his or her own confidence in the 
correctness of the answer chosen. This question is intended as 
reflection on the previous answer and prompt into the next step. 
Change answer Allowed the participants to change their answer to the performance 
assessment question. If the answer was NO,  participants would go 
directly to the demographics section of this instrument. 
Review answer to 
multiple-choice 
question 
If the participant wished to make changes, he or she was shown the 
multiple choice question again, with the previously chosen answer 
highlighted and accompanied by the associated mechanism 
explanation presented earlier. The participant was also asked to 
explain why the new choice was better than the previous one.  
Demographics 
 
The following demographics variables are collected: 
1. Age group 
2. Gender 
3. Income group 
4. Undergraduate major 
5. Intended medical specialty 
 
 49 
 
Two prior-knowledge assessment questions for the same domain are presented 
below. For the all that apply question, the choices that should be included in the correct 
answer (selected) are marked with “(T)”.  
All that apply question: In the presence of inflammation the following are raised 
(check all that apply): 
1. Platelets (T) 
2. Ferritin (T) 
3. Caeruloplasmin (T) 
4. Fibrinogen (T) 
5. Complement proteins (T) 
Single choice question: An 18 month old infant male presents with sudden onset 
of cough. Suspecting a foreign body aspiration in which area of the lung does this happen 
more frequently? 
1. Left upper pulmonary lobe 
2. Right upper pulmonary lobe 
3. Right lower pulmonary lobe (Correct answer) 
4. Left lower pulmonary lobe 
The performance assessment task was composed of three mandatory steps and a 
fourth one left at the participant’s choice. The mandatory portion presented a brief 
scenario the participant and asked him or her to answer a multiple-choice question as 
shown below. 
Scenario: “A 3-year-old male, known with seasonal allergies, presents at the 
clinic with difficulty breathing - increased respiratory rate, wheezing, and cough. 
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Symptoms started two days ago. No fever. Parents noted this morning a fine rash 
appearing on his abdomen. The rash seems to be getting worse.” 
Question: Which of the following is the most probable diagnostic? 
1. Anaphylaxis 
2. Asthma exacerbation (Correct answer) 
3. Pneumonia 
4. Foreign body aspiration 
5. Roseola 
After providing an answer to the multiple-choice question, the participants were 
asked to provide an account about the mechanisms which suggest the chosen diagnostic 
in an open-ended format. The question asked was: “What are the mechanisms that 
suggest your diagnosis?”  
Once the participant answered this question, s/he was asked to provide an 
estimation of their own confidence in the correctness of their selected diagnostic and the 
provided explanation. The question asked was: “On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘Not 
confident at all’ and 10 means ‘I am sure’, how confident are you that your answer is 
correct?” 
The last step in the performance assessment sequence was to offer the participants 
the option to change their answer if they considered it necessary. If they chose to change 
their answer, they were presented with their previous answer to change and asked to 
provide the reason why the new answer is better than the previous one. 
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Sample, Sample Size, and Participant Recruitment 
The invitation to participate was extended by e-mail to about 350 first- and 
second-year medical students pursuing a medical degree at a midwestern medical school. 
Considering a medium (.06) effect size and a power of .8 for an α = .05, the minimum 
number of subject in each of the two experiment groups is 44 (Keppel, 1991, p. 72). 
Therefore, for a two-group experimental design, a minimum of 88 participants was 
needed.  
While the experiment task was designed with second-year students in mind, first-
year medical students were invited to participate as well. This decision was made because 
in addition to the expected low participation of the second-year medical students, the 
experiment was scheduled at the end of the academic year, when many extra activities 
compete for the students’ time and attention. It was also determined by the fact that at the 
end of their first year, given the official schedule, first year students should have garnered 
enough knowledge of the appropriate domains to be able to approach the problem 
appropriately. To further improve participation, a lottery with four prizes of $200 each 
was run. 
Data Collection 
The data was collected online, using a web-based application developed for this 
study. The web-based instrument was designed to replicate the research instrument 
presented above and to store the participants’ answers in a database. The URL of this 
web-application was http://rmed.gionas.webfactional.com. Selected screenshots of the 
experiment website are presented in Appendix 8. 
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The workflow of the web-application follows closely the workflow for the 
experiment (Appendix 2). When the participant opened the application URL, s/he was 
greeted and presented with the informed consent, and then asked to provide his or her 
name and e-mail address to acknowledge consent to participate. By continuing to the 
application, the participant was directed to the first step of the prior knowledge 
assessment section. In between, the application assigned the participant to one of the two 
experiment groups, alternatively. That is, if a participant was assigned to the control 
group, the next participant was assigned to the treatment group. The randomization was 
provided by the order in which the participants opened the web application, which was 
not under the researcher’s control. 
From this point on, the web application followed the workflow of the experiment 
until the last section, the demographics, was completed. At the end of the experiment, the 
last page presents the researcher’s acknowledgment of the participant’s effort and 
contribution and provides an opportunity for the participant to receive feedback to the 
answers provided to the 10 multiple choice questions that were part of the study17. If the 
participant was interested in receiving feedback, all 10 questions were presented to him 
or her, highlighting both the participant’s answers and the correct choices. 
Data Analysis 
The collected data were analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
answer to research questions one and two was based on a quantitative analysis, while the 
answer to research question three was based on a qualitative analysis. 
                                                
17 6 questions in the prior knowledge assessment section, 3 treatment questions, 
and 1 performance assessment question. 
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Variables 
Group (independent variable, nominal scale), is determined by the group to 
which the participant is assigned: control or treatment. 
Prior knowledge score (independent variable, interval scale) has two variants: a) 
measured prior knowledge and b) self-reported prior knowledge. Measured prior 
knowledge attempts to provide an objective measure of the participants’ knowledge of 
the three main domains included in the scenario. Self-reported prior knowledge attempts 
to capture participants’ opinion of their knowledge of the three domains. This second 
measure of prior knowledge was introduced as an attempt to compensate for the small 
number of questions used to measure prior knowledge, due to the constraints of this 
study. The researchers’ opinions on the validity of self-reporting in assessing knowledge 
are divided. Nevertheless, as part of their academic activities, by the end of the school 
year, the students participating in this research worked through most of the content 
appropriate for their year of study, organized in multiple one-month long modules with 
assessments at the end of each module. Therefore, it was expected for the self-reported 
prior knowledge to include not only the opinion about self, but also others’ assessment 
based on the various forms of assessment associated with each of the academic modules 
they completed or are in process of completing. This decision is supported by existing 
research studies and meta analyses which report, for example, that no consistent over- or 
underestimation was found in self-assessment (Boud & Falchikov, 1989) or that broad 
agreement between self-assessed and objective knowledge can be observed (Ackerman, 
Beier, & Bowen, 2002). In addition, medical students have been found to be relatively 
accurate in predicting test scores for example, which suggests well-developed self-
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assessment skills (Fitzgerald, Gruppen, White, & Davis, 1997) and that self-assessment 
accuracy is relatively stable for the first two years of medical school (Fitzgerald, White, 
& Gruppen, 2003).  
Measured prior knowledge is calculated as the sum of the answers to the first six 
multiple-choice questions in the research instrument. Because two types of multiple-
choice questions, single choice and all that apply, were used in the measurement of prior 
knowledge, the scoring method tried to account for their relative difficulty. Therefore, a 
first rule used in scoring was to assign each question a number of points equal to the 
number of possible answers. The multiple-choice questions with a single answer choice 
were scored on the “all or nothing” principle. That is, for a correct answer the score was 
equal to the number of answers available for that question, which accounts for its relative 
difficulty measured in terms of number of answer choices, while for an incorrect answer 
the score was zero.  
For the all that apply questions, a correct choice was represented either by a 
checked answer if that answer was supposed to be checked, or by an unchecked answer if 
that answer was supposed to be unchecked. Therefore, for these questions scores were 
calculated as a sum of individual answer scores as follows. If the participant correctly 
assessed the answer choice by either checking it or leaving it unchecked, as appropriate 
for each situation, that answer choice received one point. If the participant incorrectly 
assessed the answer by either checking it or leaving it unchecked when the reverse would 
have been true, zero points were awarded. The minimum score for each question was 
zero while the maximum score is equal to the number of answer options in each question.  
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Self-reported prior knowledge was computed as the sum of three domain-specific 
self-rating scores, provided on a scale from one to 10, at the very beginning of the 
experiment, resulting in a final range of values from three to 30. 
Performance score (transfer task, dependent variable). The performance score 
was determined in three ways, resulting in three different performance scores for the 
same task: a) a categorical performance score (nominal scale), b) a total performance 
score (interval scale) and c) an adjusted performance score (interval scale). The 
categorical performance score reflects only the answer (choice) the participant provides 
to the multiple-choice performance question, unbiased by other variables in the 
experiment. The total performance score accounts for the answer to the multiple-choice 
question and for the quality of the associated explanation. The adjusted performance 
score includes the participant’s confidence in his or her own answer.   
The categorical performance score was designed to assess participants’ 
performance on the multiple choice question by itself, not biased or influenced by any 
other experiment variable. As the experiment was designed in such a way that the 
participant would not be able to go back and change the answer to the multiple-choice 
performance question after s/he moved on, this choice represents the unbiased outcome 
of the performance assessment task, which follows immediately after the practice session. 
It reflects the score of zero for an incorrect choice or one for the correct choice.  
The total performance score was calculated as the sum between the score for the 
multiple-choice question and a score ranging from zero to one resulted from applying a 
scoring rubric to assess the explanation associated with the answer to that multiple-choice 
question. The scoring rubric was developed based on both the causal diagram and an 
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interview with a subject matter expert (SME). During this interview the SME was asked 
to evaluate in an open-ended format the participants’ answers while a think-aloud 
protocol was used to capture the expert’s thoughts and observations. The researcher 
intervened only to keep the interview on track, at crossroads and to help clarify certain 
words, expressions, or situations. The think-aloud protocol for this session is presented in 
Appendix 5.  
Furthermore, an adjusted performance score was calculated to account for 
participants’ confidence in the correctness of their answer. For this, the confidence value, 
represented on a scale from one to 10, was converted to its percent value and applied 
differentially, depending on the correctness of the answer to the multiple choice question. 
This scoring variant reflects the assumption that the more confident the participant is in a 
correct answer the higher the score should be and the more confident the participant is in 
a wrong answer, the lower the score should be. That is, if the participant answered the 
multiple choice question correctly, the score would be equal to the percent value of the 
confidence score, whereas if the participant answered the multiple choice question 
incorrectly, the score would be equal to the negative value of the percent value of the 
confidence score.  
Year of study (covariate). The inclusion of first-year medical students in this 
experiment together with the second-year medical students on a task that was designed 
for the average second-year student suggests that second-year students will probably 
perform better than first-year students. Therefore, to better observe the effects of the 
applied treatment, the year of study was included as a covariate to control for its impact 
on the performance measures. 
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Analysis 
To answer research questions one and two, two statistical tests are used, 
depending on the type of dependent variable in the analysis. For the quasi-continuous 
variants of the performance score, the total and the adjusted performance scores, the 
analysis was conducted using a one-way, between groups ANCOVA statistical test, with 
the performance score as dependent variable, experiment group as independent variable, 
and year of study as covariate.  
Prior knowledge was introduced as an independent variable while searching for 
an answer to the second research question to account for its role as a possible moderator. 
In this case, since prior knowledge is expected to be dependent on the year of study, the 
year of study was introduced as a covariate in the analysis. As a result, to answer the 
second research question, an ANCOVA statistical test was used, with year of study as a 
covariate. For the categorical performance score, the analysis was conducted using a 
binomial logistic regression statistical test (Pedhazur, 1997) involving the same 
dependent and independent variables. This analysis is designed to provide information 
about both variables individually, and about any interaction that might occur between 
them. This analysis tests if prior knowledge is a moderator (Baron & Kenny, 1986) of the 
relationship between the treatment and the participant’s performance. For this analysis, 
the prior knowledge variable is dichotomized to “high” and “low” using the sample mean 
as cutoff point to group the data. Since this is a regression type analysis, all included 
variables will be considered as part of the equation. Therefore the year of study was be 
included in this analysis alongside prior knowledge variable.  
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The answer to research question three was approached through a qualitative 
analysis. From a qualitative perspective, the analysis looked at the answers provided by 
12 participants, three at each of the two ends of the performance measure, for each 
experiment group. That is, the analysis included the three participants with the lowest 
performance scores and the three participants with the highest performance scores, for 
each experiment group. The analysis looked at how well the explanation matched the 
expert’s influence diagram and how well the concepts, relationships and mechanisms 
were defined. 
From a different perspective, the qualitative analysis also looked at the answers 
provided by the participants that chose to change their answers to the performance 
question, and at the rationale they provide for this change. The answers provided by 
subjects in both experiment groups were considered. 
Summary 
To study the effects of using practice of self-explanation as methodology to help 
people’s causal reasoning processes, a two-group between subjects, completely 
randomized experiment was designed, informed by the research literature and two pilot 
studies. This experiment was conducted with medical students, as the medical field relies 
heavily on causal reasoning for achieving performance.  
The research instrument was designed to provide the means to allow the 
participants in the treatment group to practice self-explanation strategies while 
controlling for other factors. Delivered online, using a web-based application designed 
for this purpose, the research instrument allowed for collection of data for both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses. The quantitative analyses showed whether an effect 
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of using self-explanation existed, while the qualitative analysis furthered the 
understanding of how it helped causal reasoning. 
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CHAPTER 4: Results 
 
 
 
The data were collected online using an application designed and programmed by 
the researcher. The experiment website was open for four weeks toward the end of the 
academic year, during the month of April, 2009. During this time, three e-mail messages 
were sent to about 350 first- and second-year medical students. The first message sent 
was the initial invitation to participate, while the other two were reminders. Answers 
from 147 participants were collected. After removing duplicate and incomplete answers, 
there were 117 valid data points, of which 44 were first-year medical students and 73 
were second year medical students. Duplicate records were removed by deleting the 
newest record. When the subject quit the experiment early and attempted to continue later 
the two records were merged whenever possible18 by keeping the older of the two sets of 
values. A record was considered incomplete when one or more of the following data was 
missing: one or more scores from the self-reported prior knowledge set, one or more of 
the answers to the prior-knowledge measurement question set, and/or the complete 
answer to the performance assessment question. 
Variables 
A summary of the variables included in the analysis is presented in Table 3. 
                                                
18 Same experiment group and no missing data between the two records. 
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Table 3 
Variables 
Name Description Range/Values 
Dependent variable(s) 
(measure performance on the same task using three alternative scores) 
Categorical 
performance score 
Performance assessment multiple-choice 
question answer, disregarding other 
variables or explanations. Represents the 
unbiased initial answer. 
Values are 0 or 1 
Total performance 
score 
A score calculated to account for the 
correctness of the answer choice and the 
quality of the explanation.  
Range from 0 to 2 
Adjusted 
performance score 
The categorical performance score 
adjusted by the self-reported confidence in 
the correctness of chosen diagnostic. 
Aimed at representing the strength of the 
participant’s constructed mental model. 
Range from 0 to 2 
Independent variables 
Experiment group The experiment condition to which the 
participant was assigned. 
Either “control” or 
“treatment” 
Self-reported prior 
knowledge 
The sum of self-reported scores for three 
different knowledge domains. Converted 
to a categorical variable using the sample 
mean as cutoff point. 
Values are “Low” 
or “High” 
Measured prior 
knowledge 
A value calculated based on the answers 
the respondents provided to the six prior 
knowledge questions. Converted to a 
categorical variable using the sample mean 
as cutoff point. 
Values are “Low” 
or “High” 
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Dependent Variable(s) 
Categorical Performance Score 
The categorical performance score was calculated by assigning a value of zero to 
a wrong answer choice or a value of one to the correct answer choice. Because this is a 
categorical variable, the analysis was performed using a logistic regression statistical test 
(Pedhazur, 1997), specifically designed for the study of categorical variables through 
regression analysis. 
Table 4 
Frequency table for the categorical performance score 
 Correct answer Incorrect answer Total 
First year 12 32 44 
Second year 37 36 73 
Total 49 68 117 
Total Performance Score 
To compute the total performance score, the first step was to construct the scoring 
rubric for participants’ explanations. The scoring rubric was developed based on the 
influence diagram developed for the domain (Appendix 1) and an interview with a 
subject matter expert (SME). During this interview the SME was asked to use a think 
aloud protocol while analyzing participants’ answers. The interview was audio recorded 
and transcribed. The transcription was reviewed and analyzed to understand and extract 
the elements the SEM was looking for when analyzing the participants’ explanations. 
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The analysis suggests that the subject matter expert looked at three main themes 
or elements: 1) presence of the correct symptoms and/or of related keywords indicative of 
these symptoms, 2) the level of detail of the answer and 3) the presence of mechanisms 
expressed as one or more correct sequences of events. For each criterion, using the 
influence diagram and the interview data, a set of scores was developed. Once the scoring 
rubric was developed, it was presented for evaluation to the same subject matter expert 
who considered it appropriate and proposed no changes.  Each of these criteria and the 
associated scores is explained in Appendix 5 along with specific examples. Using the 
rubric, two raters, the researcher and a physician (other than the SME), scored the 
participants’ answers. The two raters discussed the rubric and decided to proceed by 
reading and analyzing each answer separately, scoring it separately, and negotiating a 
final score. In the end, the total performance score was computed by summing the score 
for the answer choice (zero or one) with the score for the explanation converted to a 
percentage19.  The summary statistics for this variable are presented in Table 2. 
Table 5 
Summary statistics for the total performance score 
Statistic Value 
Min -2.00 
Max 7.00 
Median 1.00 
Mean 1.584 
SD 2.094 
                                                
19 The conversion to percentage was performed to represent the score for the 
explanation as a value between zero and one to allow for equal weight for the answer and 
the explanation in the final score.  
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Adjusted Performance Score 
The third variant of the performance score, the adjusted performance score, was 
determined based on the assumption that the confidence the participant had in his or her 
own answer has different meaning for correct and wrong answer choices. That is, one can 
infer that the more confident a subject is in a correct answer, the closer the constructed 
mental model of the scenario is to the expert’s model. Conversely, the more confident a 
subject is in an incorrect answer, the farther away the constructed model can be 
considered to be from the expert’s model. Therefore, for a correct answer choice, the 
score is one plus the value of the self-confidence while for the wrong answer choices, the 
score is the one minus the value of the reported confidence.  
 
Table 6 
Summary statistics for the adjusted performance score 
Statistic Value 
Min 0.22 
Max 1.78 
Median 1.00 
Mean 0.97 
SD 0.3839 
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Independent Variables 
Experiment Group 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the participants by experiment group and year of 
study. 
Table 7 
Participants distribution by experiment group and year of study 
 Control Treatment Total 
First year 25 19 44 
Second year 36 37 73 
Total 61 56 117 
 
Prior Knowledge 
Prior knowledge was measured in two ways. The multi-domain self-reported 
prior knowledge variable was computed as the sum of three self-reported single domain 
measures of prior knowledge: immunology, physiology and pathology. The scale variable 
was transformed into a two-level categorical variable (low/high) by dividing the sample 
in two groups against its mean (14.1966). After transformation, there were 51 participants 
in the high prior knowledge category and 66 participants in the low prior knowledge 
category. Table 8 shows the participants distribution by level of self-reported prior 
knowledge and year of study. 
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Table 8 
Participants distribution by level of self-reported prior knowledge and year of study 
 Low prior knowledge High prior knowledge Total 
First year 39 5 44 
Second year 27 46 73 
Total 66 51 117 
 
The measured prior knowledge variable was computed as the sum of the scores of 
six multiple-choice questions. The process for calculating the measured prior knowledge 
score is presented in detail in the methodology section. For this analysis, the obtained 
scale variable was converted to a two-level categorical variable (low prior knowledge and 
high prior knowledge) using its mean (13.6581) as cutoff point. After conversion, there 
were 65 subjects in the low measured prior knowledge category and 52 subjects in the 
high measured prior knowledge category. Table 9 shows participant distribution by level 
of measured prior knowledge and year of study. 
Table 9 
Participants distribution by level of measured prior knowledge (PK) and year of study 
 Low PK High PK Total 
First year 26 18 44 
Second year 39 34 73 
Total 65 52 117 
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Analysis of normality 
Kurtosis and skewedness calculations are used to test the assumption of normality 
of the dependent variable as required by the analysis of covariance statistic test. For the 
continuous variables in this study, the values of the two parameters and the diagnostic 
decision are presented in Table 10. 
The z-scores for measured prior knowledge suggest the existence of one outlier. 
After further analysis of the corresponding data point, the decision was made to keep it in 
the analysis. The decision is also supported by the values of skewedness and kurtosis that 
are within the recommended limits, suggesting that the assumption of normality is 
verified.  
Table 10 
Summary of normality and outlier analysis  
Variable Skewedness Kurtosis z-scores 
 
Diagnostic decision 
Total performance 
score 0.576 -0.649 
Min: -1.71 
Max:  2.59 
Normally 
distributed 
Adjusted performance 
score 0.115 -0.624 
Min: -1.95 
Max:  2.11 
Normally 
distributed 
Self-reported prior 
knowledge 0.134 -0.124 
 Min: -2.16 
Max:  2.31 
Normally 
distributed 
Measured prior 
knowledge 0.435 0.781 
 Min: -2.80 
Max:  3.75 
Normally 
distributed 
Note: Boundary values for skewedness, kurtosis, and z-scores are ±3. 
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Research Results 
Research Question 1  
Does the practice of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation technique 
affects, on average, learners’ performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
 
Table 11 summarizes the types of statistical analyses performed to answer this 
question. Given that both first and second year medical students were invited to 
participate in the experiment, the year was introduced in the analysis as a covariate 
variable to control for its impact. 
 
Table 11 
Research Question 1: Types of statistical analyses 
Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable Categorical 
Performance Score 
Total Performance 
Score 
Adjusted 
Performance Score 
Experiment group Logistic Regression One-way ANCOVA One-way ANCOVA 
 
For the categorical performance score, a logistic regression statistic test was 
used. The results show no significant interaction effect and no significant main effect of 
the experiment group. However, the results do show a significant main effect of the year 
of study. The results are presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Logistic regression results for experiment group x year of study 
Predictor β SE β Wald χ2 df p eβ 
Constant 0.328 0.305 1.154 1  0.283 1.388 
Experiment group (1) -0.608 0.389 2.443 1 0.118 0.544 
Year of study (1) -0.948 0.416 5.599 1 0.018* 0.347 
Total   χ2 df p  
Overall model evaluation       
Likelihood ratio   8.814 2   0.012*  
Goodness of fit       
Hosmer & Lemeshov test   1.540 2 0.463  
Note: The analysis was conducted using the Binary Logistic Regression in SPSS, using 
the enter method. The significance level was set at 0.05. Cox and Snell R2 = 0.073, 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.098. 
The results suggest that the experiment group does not influence the odds for 
choosing the correct answer versus choosing an incorrect answer on the performance 
assessment multiple-choice question. From a different perspective, being a first-year 
medical student decreases the odds of answering correctly versus answering incorrectly 
by a factor of 0.347, when compared to second-year medical students. 
For the total performance score, the results of the ANCVOA analysis are 
presented in Table 14. The data show that the treatment group had no effect on 
performance. The covariate (year of study) was significantly related to the total 
performance score. 
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Table 14 
ANCOVA table - Experiment group × year of study for the total performance score 
Source df F η p 
Year of study 1 5.798 0.055 0.018* 
Experiment group 1 1.477 0.014   0.227 
Error 98 (45.355)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. * p < 0.05 
Performing the same statistical test for the adjusted performance score suggests 
similar outcomes. That is, the ANCOVA analysis shows no significant main effect of the 
experiment condition (F(1,114) = 1.771; p = 0.186) on the total performance score. The 
covariate (year of study) was significantly related to the total performance score 
(F(1,114) = 4.37; p = 0.039 (< 0.05)).  
Research Question 2 
How does prior knowledge of relevant domains relate to the learners' 
performance on causal reasoning tasks? 
For each type of performance score included in this analysis, Table 15 shows the 
statistical test run for each DV (Dependent Variable) – IV (Independent Variable) 
combination. The treatment condition and the covariate were always included in the 
analysis. 
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Table 15 
Research Question 2: Types of statistical analyses 
Dependent variable  
Categorical 
performance 
score 
Total  
performance 
score 
Adjusted 
performance 
score 
Self-reported 
prior knowledge 
Logistic 
regression 
Factorial 
ANCOVA 
Factorial 
ANCOVA Independent 
variable 
Measured prior 
knowledge 
Logistic 
regression 
Factorial 
ANCOVA 
Factorial 
ANCOVA 
 
Categorical Performance Score 
The categorical performance score associates the value of one (true) or zero 
(false) with a correct or incorrect answer to the performance assessment question 
respectively. Binary logistic regression is the statistical test which was run to analyze the 
categorical performance score. The same analysis was performed for each of the two 
measures of prior knowledge, measured and self-reported by the participants, as the 
independent variable. 
Measured prior knowledge. The results of the logistic regression test (Table 16) show a 
significant interaction between measured prior knowledge and the experiment condition. 
That is, the odds of answering the multiple-choice performance assessment question 
correctly are different for different levels of prior knowledge for the participants in 
different treatment conditions. Further analysis (Appendix 6) shows that for the high 
prior knowledge group, the treatment condition does not influence these odds. For the 
participants in the low measured prior knowledge group, the odds of answering the 
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question correctly versus answering it incorrectly are decreased by a factor of 0.387 by 
being in the control group as opposed to being in the treatment group. The coding of the 
dependent variables is presented in  
Table 17. 
 
Table 16 
Logistic regression results for the analysis with the measured prior knowledge 
Predictor β SE β Wald χ2 df p eβ 
Constant -1.718 0.734 5.482 1 0.019* 0.179 
Experiment group (1) by  
Measured prior knowledge (1) -0.950 0.443 4.590 1 0.032* 0.387 
Year of study 1.014 0.420 5.829 1 0.016* 0.368 
Total   χ2 df P  
Overall model evaluation       
Likelihood ratio b   11.217 2 0.004**  
Goodness of fit       
Hosmer & Lemeshow test c   2.362 2 0.307  
Note: a The analysis was conducted using Binary Logistic Regression in SPSS using the 
backward elimination process. The elimination process continued until nothing could be 
eliminated from the model anymore. The significance level was set at 0.05. Cox and 
Snell R2 = 0.091, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.123. The elimination process was in three steps. The 
model significance was 0.0.023 in the first step, 0.010 for the second step, and 0.004 for 
the third step. b p < 0.05 means there is adequate fit of the data to the model, meaning that 
at least one predictor is significantly related to the response variable. c A finding of non-
significance indicates that the model adequately fits the data. 
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Table 17  
Categorical variables parameter coding for logistic regression with measured prior 
knowledge 
  Frequency Parameter coding (1) 
Low 65 1.000 Measured prior knowledge 
High 52 0.000 
Control 61 1.000 Group 
Treatment 56 0.000 
 
 
Self-reported prior knowledge. The results of the binary logistic regression analysis are 
presented in 
Table 20. The coding of the categorical factors is shown in Table 17. The logistic 
regression test shows a significant interaction effect between the treatment condition and 
self-reported prior knowledge. 
 
Table 17  
Categorical variables parameter coding for logistic regression with self-reported prior 
knowledge 
  Frequency Parameter coding (1) 
Low 66 .000 Self-reported prior knowledge 
High 51 1.000 
Control 61 .000 Group 
Treatment 56 1.000 
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Table 20 
Logistic regression results for the analysis with self-reported prior knowledge 
Predictor β SE β Wald χ2 df p eβ 
Constant 0.682 0.441 2.387 1 0.122 1.978 
Experiment group (1) by  
Self-reported PKa (1) 1.583 0.805 3.864 1 0.049* 4.868 
Year of study (1) -1.140 0.487 5.477 1 0.019 0.320 
Total   χ2 df P  
Overall model evaluation       
Likelihood ratio c   13.101 3 0.004*  
Goodness of fit       
Hosmer & Lemeshow test d   1.530 4 0.821  
Note: a PK represents “prior knowledge”. b The analysis was conducted using Binary 
Logistic Regression in SPSS using the backward elimination process. The elimination 
process continued until nothing could be eliminated from the model anymore. The 
significance level was set at 0.05. Cox and Snell R2 = 0.106, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.143. The 
elimination process was in two steps. The model significance was 0.011 in the first step 
and 0.004 for the second step. c p < 0.05 means there is adequate fit of the data to the 
model, meaning that at least one predictor is significantly related to the response variable. 
d A finding of non-significance indicates that the model adequately fits the data. 
Further analysis (Appendix 7) shows that, for the participants with low self-
reported prior knowledge, the treatment condition does not influence de odds of 
answering correctly versus answering incorrectly. For the participants who report high 
levels of prior knowledge, the odds of answering the question correctly are increased by 
a factor of 4.385 for the participants in the treatment group compared to the participants 
in the control group. 
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Total Performance Score 
The total performance score was calculated by combining the participant’s score 
for the performance question and the score for the provided explanation. For both 
measures of prior knowledge, the analysis was performed using a factorial ANCOVA 
statistical test. The analysis began with measured prior knowledge as the independent 
variable, which was replaced for further analysis by self-reported prior knowledge. 
Measured prior knowledge. The two-way between–groups ANCOVA with two 
between-groups factors included the year of study as a covariate to control for its effects. 
This analysis shows no significance for either the interaction between experiment group 
or the measured prior knowledge (F(1,96) = 0.213; p = 0.645) and the simple effects of 
experiment group (F(1,96) = 0.985; p = 0.324) and measured prior knowledge (F(1,96) = 
1.419; p = 0.236). The covariate, year of study, was significantly related to the total 
performance score (F(1,96) = 5.426; p = 0.022 (< 0.05)).  
Self-reported prior knowledge. The analysis shows a significant interaction 
between the experiment group and the self-reported level of prior knowledge (F(1,96) = 
4.799; p = 0.031 (<0.05)) after controlling for the year of study. The nature of this 
interaction is shown in Figure 1. Further analysis shows that both simple effects, 
experiment group (F(1,96) = 1.851; p = 0.177) and self-reported prior knowledge 
(F(1,96) = 0.997; p = 0.32) are not significant. The covariate, year of study, was 
significantly related to the total performance score (F(1,96) = 7.801; p = 0.006 (< 0.05)).  
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Figure 1. Estimated marginal means for total performance score 
 
Post-hoc analysis20 suggests that the difference is more pronounced between the 
subjects reporting high levels of prior knowledge in the control and treatment groups, 
followed by the difference between the participants in the treatment group who reported 
low versus high prior knowledge levels. The representation in Figure 1 suggests that 
practicing self-explanation considerably affects the performance of the subjects in the 
high self-reported prior knowledge category but has little effect on the subjects reporting 
low levels of prior knowledge. That is, the effect of the applied treatment seems to be 
dependent on the level of prior knowledge reported by the participants. 
                                                
20 The analysis was conducted using Fisher LSD and Tukey HSD tests. 
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Adjusted Performance Score 
Measured prior knowledge. A two-way ANCOVA analysis with two between-
subject factors was performed. The results (Table 19) show no significant interaction 
between the experiment group and measured prior knowledge. Further analysis shows no 
significant main effect of the experiment group, but indicates a significant main effect of 
the measured prior knowledge factor. That is, the subjects with higher levels of measured 
prior knowledge show a tendency to perform better than the subjects with lower levels of 
prior knowledge. The covariate (year of study) shows borderline correlation with the 
adjusted performance score.  
Table 19 
ANCOVA table - Experiment group x Measured prior knowledge, with year-of-study 
Source df F η p 
Year of study 1 3.877 0.537 0.051 
Experiment group (G) 1 1.428 0.198 0.235 
Measured prior knowledge (MPK) 1 4.261 0.590   0.041* 
G x MPK 1 0.475 0.066 0.492 
Error 112 (15.512)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. * p < 0.05 
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Figure 2. Estimated marginal means of adjusted performance score for measured prior 
knowledge 
 
Self-reported prior knowledge. The data were analyzed using two-way ANCOVA 
with two between-groups factors and year of study as covariate. The results are presented 
in Table 20. This analysis shows a significant interaction between the experiment group 
(treatment condition) and self-reported prior knowledge, while showing no significant 
main effects. The nature of the interaction is shown in Figure 3. The covariate (year of 
study) was significantly related to the adjusted performance score. 
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Table 20 
ANCOVA table - Experiment group x self-reported prior knowledge for the adjusted 
performance score 
Source df F η p 
Year of study 1 6.219 0.848   0.014* 
Experiment group (G) 1 2.247 0.306 0.137 
Self-reported prior knowledge (SRPK) 1 1.451 0.198 0.231 
G x SRPK 1 4.781 0.652   0.031* 
Error 112 (15.271)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. * p < 0.05 
 
Figure 3. Estimated marginal means of the adjusted performance score, controlling for 
year of study, for self-reported prior knowledge 
 
Further analysis suggests that the treatment condition has different effects for 
different levels of prior knowledge. That is, practice of self-explanations seems to have 
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significant effects on performance for the participants reporting higher levels of prior 
knowledge and almost no effects on performance for the participants reporting lower 
levels.  
Qualitative Analysis 
Research Question 3 
How does the use of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation technique 
influence participants' accounts of how and why they chose a certain answer or reach a 
certain solution? 
To answer this last research question an in-depth qualitative analysis was initially 
planned. Due to this experiment’s limitations, the data collected did not present the 
expected depth and breath. These limitations include (1) the delivery at the end of the 
school year, which constrained the amount of time and effort the participants were able 
and willing to give for the experiment, (2) the fact that medical school training targets 
performance on national examinations, thus favoring quick answers to multiple choice 
questions over explanations, (3) oversimplification of the communication with those 
outside the field due to complexity and difficulty of understanding of medical 
explanations and (4) communication with peers based on keywords and vocabulary that is 
expected to express, many times in very few words, an entire network of causal relations. 
Therefore, less than optimal data makes this analysis more difficult and limits its depth. 
Since the qualitative data collected for this experiment were not extensive, no special 
tools or software applications were used in the analysis. A subject matter expert was 
consulted during the qualitative analysis, whenever needed, about the various aspects of 
the answers the participants provided. 
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The analysis looked at two aspects of the participants’ explanations. First, it 
looked at the explanations the participants provided to support their answer to the 
performance assessment question, for both control and treatment groups.  The 
explanations provided by the participants with the lowest performance scores were 
compared with those provided by the participants with the highest performance scores. 
Second, the analysis looked at how and why the participants decided to change their 
answer when provided with the opportunity to do so. 
Mechanism Explanations 
Two scores, the total performance score and the adjusted performance score were 
used to select the three best and three worst performers. When more than three 
participants shared a score at either end of the spectrum, random selection was used to 
reduce the group to three subjects. In analyzing the explanations, several themes were 
observed across cases. 
A first theme is based on the observation that the answers included in the low 
score category, for both variants of the performance score, in both experiment groups, 
show that of the total of 12 cases analyzed, 11 point to “Roseola” as the answer of choice. 
Statement such as “presence of a rash” or “Roseola is a three-day rash with similar 
symptoms” use either the answer choice directly or use the “rash” as the symptom which 
was determinant in their decision. “Roseola” was one of the answer choices presented to 
the participants and was included because one of the symptoms presented in the scenario, 
rash, is one of the symptoms that could suggest this diagnosis. Nevertheless, the other 
symptoms that would make the diagnosis of “Roseola” certain are missing from the 
scenario, suggesting that rash is a symptom related to a different condition.  
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On the other hand, there seems to be a tendency of the subjects at the higher end 
of the performance score to attempt to explain the rash in the context of the correct 
answer, even if it is not necessarily part of it. For example, subject 137 explains:  
Subject 137: 
“The allergens have triggered histamine release which causes 
bronchiolar constriction and vasodilation of the vessels of the skin, 
producing a rash.” 
Or subject 2, who states “… histamine could cause his respiratory [symptoms] as 
well as the fine rash that had appeared on the abdomen.” 
Most answers provided by the participants in the lowest performance score 
subsample are brief compared with the answers of those participants in the highest 
performance score. Statements composed of only a few words, similar to “The presence 
of a rash” or “symptoms followed by a rash a few days later” seem to be common. 
At the higher end of the performance score, explanations include references to 
causal mechanisms, mostly as sequences of events, interpreted by the SME as 
representations of causality. In this context, comparing the answers with the causal map 
the expert developed was difficult, as the researcher and the SME needed to infer the 
participants’ thought process. For example, looking at the explanation provided by 
subject 73, “allergy, Th2, humoral response” and comparing it to the influence diagram, 
one can observe that, for that subject, the entire map was reduced to three components, 
each including multiple causal mechanisms. In addition, the network of causal relations 
represented in the map was reduced to a simple linear causal relation. 
 83 
 
In effect, in some answers, causal relations are linear, with at most three or four 
nodes. For example, the explanation provided by subject 73 presented above contains 
three nodes, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Influence diagram presentation of the explanation provided by subject 73 
 
In other cases, while the answer starts in a linear fashion, the participant’s attempt 
to provide a more detailed explanation creates the need for two paths at the end of the 
causal chain. For example, the explanation provided by subject 137 can be converted to a 
causal diagram as follows (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Influence diagram presentation of the explanation provided by subject 137 
 
Subject 25 presents a different explanation. 
Subject 25: 
“Histamine receptor activation leading to mast cell proliferation 
leading to wheezing (bronchial constriction), cough, increased 
respiratory rate.” 
This explanation would be represented graphically as follows (Figure 6): 
Allergy	   Th2	   Humoral	  response	  
Allergens	   histamine	  release	   bronchiolar	  constriction	  vasodilation	   rash	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Figure 6. Influence diagram presentation of the explanation provided by subject 25. 
 
Compared to the influence diagram for asthma presented in Appendix 1, the 
diagrams developed based on the participants’ explanations are simple, composed of a 
small number of nodes (two to six nodes on average), with each node representing a high-
level concept or process which, in the expert’s diagram, is composed of multiple, 
interrelated concepts and causal relations. In addition, the diagrams, while correct, are 
relatively linear and lack long branches or feedback loops.  
Another common theme that emerged in multiple instances is the presence of 
some form of a differential diagnostic between some or all of the five diagnostics offered 
as possible answers for the performance assessment question. For example, subjects 10 
and 155 provide the following explanations: 
Subject 10 
“No fever so that means it was likely not pneumonia. Anaphylaxis 
is more severe and would require attention sooner than 2 days. 
Wheezing and cough happen to try to disperse the foreign body 
from the respiratory tract, and the respiratory rate increased to 
make up for the lack of air passing through.” 
Histamine	  receptor	  activation	   Mast	  cell	  proliferation	  
Wheezing	  (bronchial	  constriction)	  
Cough	  
Increased	  repiratory	  rate	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Subject 155 
“Well, I actually tried to rule out the other options. There was no 
fever so I ruled out roseola. The Presentation did not seem to be 
acute like anaphylaxis. Beyond that I wasn’t really sure. It seemed 
to me that the remaining options could cause the respiratory 
symptoms, but I’m not sure that Pneumonia or a foreign body 
aspiration would cause a rash. Asthma is IgE mediated and could 
therefore present with a skin irritation similar to anaphylaxis.” 
In both cases, the participant goes through some or all the diagnostics provided 
and attempts to disprove each of them using the symptoms presented in the scenario. In 
the case of subject 155, the participant clearly presents the elimination thought process 
“… tried to rule out other options” after which the participant proceeds to list the options 
and associate them with the existing symptoms. While the participants were asked to 
explain the mechanisms they considered when they answered the question, they 
explained a much more extensive causal reasoning process which contains the sought 
explanation as a component. That is, understanding of the causal processes behind their 
answer is only part of the differential diagnostic process they needed to perform to decide 
upon it.  
Control vs. Treatment Group 
The explanations provided by the participants in the low performance score 
category do not seem to indicate notable differences between the control and the 
treatment groups. For example, subject 1 in the control group supports the diagnostic for 
Roseola with “The presence of a rash”, similar to the explanation provided by subject 4 in 
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the treatment group: “presence of rash around his abdomen”. The same similarity can be 
found between subject 17 in the control group who explains “Roseola is a 3 day rash with 
similar symptoms” and subject 23 in the treatment group who explains “symptoms 
followed by rash a few days later” or subject 95 in the same group who explains “Onset 
of rash a few days after the other symptoms.” 
Looking at the high performance score group, the subjects in the treatment group 
tend to explain the causal chains of events, even if rather brief, better than the subjects in 
the control group. For example, subject 140 in the control group explains: 
Subject 140 
“Patient is known to have an IgE mediated process already in 
seasonal allergies. With 3 days worth of coughing and wheezing 
and no fever, an infectious process, though not off the differential 
is unlikely. It is also likely that his rash is allergic in origin and is 
worsening with the allergen likely to have caused the exacerbation 
of his asthma.” 
While the above explanation contains a number of causal relations, some of them 
only restate the information in the scenario: “… known to have an IgE mediated process 
already in seasonal allergies.” In this sentence, the subject fills in part of the mechanism 
by which seasonal allergies work, the behavior of the Immunoglobulin E (IgE), but fails 
to associate it with the current symptoms. S/he also works through an elimination 
process, associating the absence of fever with the absence of an infectious process. This 
statement is correct by itself, but it does not explain a mechanism that supports the 
correct answer either. It is, however, a mechanism that invalidates an alternative answer. 
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In the end, the subject tries to explain the rash in the context of the correct answer, but 
generally fails to provide an explanation that supports the chosen diagnostic. 
On the other hand, the subjects in the treatment group tend to provide, even if just 
in a few words, explanations incorporating more elaborate causal relations, such as 
subjects 73 or 137 whose explanations were analyzed before. Their explanations also 
tend to provide more details related directly to the causal processes that are behind the 
correct answer than those of the participants in the control group, who seem to have a 
tendency to work through a differential diagnosis rather than to provide a direct 
explanation, such as subject 104’s explanation presented above. 
Reasons for Changing the Answer 
A first look at the participants that changed their answer reveals that of 12, only 
two participants were in the treatment group, while the remaining 10 were in the control 
group condition. This observation suggests that the subjects that practiced self-
explanation considered their answer to the performance measurement question more 
carefully than the participants that did not practice self-explanation, thus showing less 
need to revisit it when given the chance. Looking at the confidence levels expressed by 
the subjects that decided to change their answer one can observe that on a scale from one 
to 10, none of the participants rated their confidence with more than five, with most of 
them in the one and two range. 
Further analysis suggests that the main reason why subjects changed their answer 
is related to the need to reread or reexamine the scenario in order to elaborate the 
explanation required by the performance assessment question. Subject 80, instead of 
presenting an explanation in his or her first explanation, admits “Now that I’m reading 
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the question again I know that it can NOT be Roseola as …” Then, when explaining the 
rationale for which the answer was changed s/he follows up with an explanation of the 
correct answer. Alternatively, subject 90, who in his or her initial explanation states: “No 
fever, history, and I think I am wrong now that I am looking at it” but still misses the 
answer afterwards. 
Once more, these explanations show the impact of the last symptom presented in 
the scenario text, the rash. It looks like many of the subjects in this category considered 
this symptom to be determinant for the diagnostic and somehow disregarded all the other 
symptoms presented to them earlier in the description. After rereading the scenario, most 
likely while trying to explain the mechanisms, the subjects tended to reassess the 
importance of the rash symptom and decide upon the correct answer choice.  
There is at least one subject who admited that s/he made the wrong choice on 
accident as noted by “Clicked the wrong button” and then took the chance to correct that 
error. One other subject admitted that s/he was “… a bit distracted doing multiple things 
at once while taking this survey” and got it right the second time. 
Summary 
For this research, data collection was conducted during the month of April 2009 at 
a midwestern medical school. 147 first and second-year medical students agreed to 
participate, of which 117 provided usable data points. The dependent variable in the 
quantitative studies was the performance score, with its three variants, total performance 
score, categorical performance score and adjusted performance score. The main 
independent variables in the various analyses were the experiment condition and the 
measure of prior knowledge, with its two variants, measured prior knowledge and self-
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reported prior knowledge. Due to the inclusion of two years of study in this experiment, 
the analysis controlled for the year of study by including it as a covariate where 
appropriate. 
Table 21 presents the summary of the results for the first research question: “Does 
the practice of self-explanation as causal mechanism elicitation technique affects, on 
average, learners’ performance on causal reasoning tasks?” Overall, if one does not 
account for the year of study, the treatment does not seem to have any significant impact 
on the subjects’ performance. The year of study, introduced as covariate, was 
significantly related to the performance score. 
Table 21 
Research Question 1 - Summary of results  
Performance 
score (PS) 
Type of statistical test Results 
Categorical 
PS Logistic regression 
No significant effects found 
Significant effect of the Year of study 
Total PS ANCOVA No significant effect of experiment group found Significant covariate relationship 
Adjusted PS ANCOVA No significant effect of experiment group found Significant covariate relationship 
Note: DV = Performance score, IV = Experiment group, Covariate = Year of study 
For the second research question, “How does prior knowledge of relevant 
domains relate to the learners' performance on causal reasoning tasks?” the results are 
shown in Table 22. In summary, the results show that self-reported prior knowledge 
interacts with the experiment group, when the statistical test controls for the year of 
study, for all performance scores. Measured prior knowledge does not seem to interact 
with the treatment condition in the case of the total performance score; it seems to have a 
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significant simple effect for the adjusted performance score and it appears to interact with 
the treatment condition for the categorical performance score.  
Table 22  
Research Question 2 – Summary of results  
Performance 
score (PS) 
Prior 
knowledge 
(PK) 
Type of 
statistical test 
Results 
Measured PK ANCOVA No significant interaction effects No significant simple effects 
Total PS 
Self-reported 
PK ANCOVA 
Significant interaction 
Simple effects were discarded 
Measured PK ANCOVA 
No significant interaction 
Significant simple effect of PK 
Not significant effect of treatment Adjusted PS 
Self-reported 
PK ANCOVA 
Significant interaction effect 
Simple effects were discarded 
Measured PK Logistic regression 
Significant interaction effect 
Simple effects were discarded Categorical 
PS Self-reported 
PK 
Logistic 
regression 
Significant interaction effect 
Simple effects were discarded 
Note: DV = Performance score (PS), IV1 = Experiment group, IV2 = Prior knowledge 
(PK), Covariate = Year of study. 
Despite the fact that collecting qualitative data was impacted by several 
significant limitations, a few trends emerged. For low performing participants, the 
answers tended to be brief with no reference to causal mechanisms or causal chains, 
whereas for the high performing participants, the answers are sensibly more elaborate, 
included references to causal mechanisms and eventually causal chains. Nevertheless, the 
causal chains that were extracted from the participants’ answers were short, linear, and 
sometimes with one or two branches, yet never included feedback loops. 
No significant differences could be observed in the answers of the participants at 
the low end of the performance scale between the control and the treatment groups. In 
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comparison, at the high end of the performance range, the participants in the treatment 
group seemed to incorporate more elaborate causal relations in their answers and provide 
more details than those in the control group. 
The inclusion of a symptom unrelated to the correct causal chains, the rash, 
prompted many participants to either use it as the most important symptom for their 
diagnostic (choosing Roseola as answer) or tried to explain it in the context of the correct 
answer (asthma attack). Finally, the decision to change the answer seems to have been 
determined by the participant’s need to reread the scenario statement in order to provide 
the explanation they were asked for, in order to support their answer choice.
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CHAPTER 5: Discussion and Implications 
 
 
 
Understanding, explaining and using causal phenomena are integral parts of 
everyday human activities. In Dickinson’s own words “Without the capacity to learn 
about and represent causal relationships between our actions and their consequences, the 
mind would be radically disconnected by the world” (2001, p. 3). Nevertheless, while 
causal reasoning and understanding is important for learning and everyday and scientific 
reasoning (Carey, 1995; Keil, 1989) scientific research reveals the many problems people 
have in dealing with causality and causally linked events (Chapman & Chapman, 1969; 
Chi, 2000b; Perkins & Grotzer, 2000; Tversky & Cahneman, 1989). In this respect this 
study looked at how cognitive strategies – more specifically self-explanation – support 
causal reasoning and understanding. For this purpose, an experiment was designed and 
deployed and data were collected and analyzed.  
Results and Analysis 
Research Question 1 
The first research question asked if the practice of self-explanation as causal 
mechanism elicitation strategy affects, on average, learners’ performance on causal 
reasoning tasks. Its aim was to observe whether significant effects on performance exist 
on near-transfer causal tasks for the participants who practiced self-explanation prior to 
this task as compared to those participants who did not. During the experiment the 
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participants in the treatment group practiced self-explanation on a set of three multiple-
choice questions by responding to a prompt that asked them to provide an explanation of 
the mechanisms behind their decision. The participants in the control group answered the 
same three multiple-choice questions, but without being asked for an explanation. No 
explanation about what self-explanation based strategies are was provided to the 
participants and no training in how it should be used was delivered. Three performance 
scores were calculated from the collected data: 1) a categorical performance score which, 
represents the raw true/false answer to the multiple-choice performance question, 2) a 
total performance score, which accounts, in addition to the raw score, for the quality of 
the mechanism explanation and 3) an adjusted performance score, which accounts for the 
participants’ confidence in the correctness of their answer. For analysis, logistic 
regression was used to analyze the categorical performance score and factorial 
ANCOVAs were used for the total and adjusted performance scores. 
Data analysis shows that no significant differences can be observed between the 
participants in the control group and those in the treatment group. The only study variable 
that shows any significant relationship is the year of study, included in the analysis as a 
covariate. That is, the logistic regression for the categorical performance score shows a 
significant effect of the year of study. More specifically, being a first-year medical 
student decreases the odds of answering correctly versus answering incorrectly by a 
factor of 0.347, when compared to second-year medical students. The ANCOVA 
analyses for Total Performance Score and Adjusted Performance Score show a 
significant covariate relationship, with second year students performing better than first 
year students. If one assumes that the year of study is a proxy for prior knowledge, the 
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results indirectly support prior findings which shows that performance is linked to the 
level of prior knowledge for both causal reasoning (e.g., Ahn & Baileson, 1996; Ahn, et 
al., 1995; Thagard, 2000) and for self-explanation (e.g., Bielaczyc, et al., 1995; Chi, et 
al., 1989; Kintsch, 1994). That is, for causal reasoning, the higher the level of prior 
knowledge, the better the performance, whereas for self-explanation, the higher the level 
of prior knowledge, the stronger the effect of using the self-explanation strategy on 
performance. Several factors, such as the type and strength of the treatment condition, the 
duration of the treatment, the timing of the experiment or the level of prior knowledge the 
participants had, can be held accountable for the observed outcome.  
One factor that could account for the observed outcome is the type and strength of 
the treatment condition. Study participants were introduced to the practice of self-
explanation indirectly through three successive practice exercises and without being 
aware of the strategy they were asked to use. Furthermore, the prompt used was generic 
and open-ended, with no prior scaffolding, instructions or directions. This argument is 
supported by prior findings which suggest that mere exposure to self-explanation leads to 
some improvement, but significantly less than when participants are instructed in how to 
use these strategies (Bielaczyc, et al., 1995). In similar studies, the success of cognitive 
strategies based on self-explanation is associated with more direct prompts (e.g., 
Berthold, et al., 2009; Hausmann, VanLehn, Nokes, & Gershman, 2009; Kirschner, et al., 
2006), usually in multiple steps (e.g., Bielaczyc, et al., 1995). That is, overall, the 
treatment might have been too weak to produce recognizable effects at this level. 
The time spent practicing self-explanation and the type of task could also account 
for the observed result. More specifically, the task used for practicing self-explanation 
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was one familiar to the participants (answering multiple-choice questions) to which the 
treatment added an open-ended mechanism explanation component. Medical students are 
trained to quickly answer multiple-choice questions without too much consideration to 
the explanation behind the scenario which is consistent with the test-taking behavior 
considered to be effective for medical board examinations. This means that if the 
participants used a cognitive strategy based on self-explanation before, they might have 
had the time to observe what they were asked to do. Since the three practice questions 
followed six multiple-choice questions designed to assess prior knowledge, some 
participants might have entered into “test-taking” mode and quickly skimmed over the 
question and answers, overlooking the explanation they were asked to provide. In this 
respect, they might have been what Renkl (1997) calls “superficial explainers”21 and 
“passive explainers”22 which raises the question of the effectiveness of the type of prompt 
used for self-explanation, supported by prior research which suggests that if the 
participants are not assisted to self-explain, the strategy does not show its full potential 
and produces diminished returns (Berthold, et al., 2009).  
As suggested by existing research (e.g., Bielaczyc, et al., 1995; Renkl, 2002), 
participants’ prior knowledge of the three domains at the time of the experiment could 
also be considered to have played a role in the observed outcome. With both first- and 
second-year medical students being invited to participate in the study, a look at the 
sequence of courses in the curriculum shed some light on the observed results. With the 
experiment designed for second-year medical students, an analysis of the curriculum 
                                                
21 Superficial explainers are explainers who assign little time to the task of 
explaining. 
22 Passive explainers are explainers with a very low level of self-explanation 
activity. 
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sequence of courses shows that, on average, first-year medical students should have had 
the knowledge to answer the question. Nevertheless, during their second year, more 
advanced courses on the same subjects as well as on associated topics deepen 
understanding of the subject matter. Considering that the Year of Study could be a rough 
representation of the level of prior knowledge the participants had, the analysis of the 
impact that participants’ level of prior knowledge had on performance might be able to 
provide a better explanation. A second research question attempts to further study the 
effects of prior knowledge on the effectiveness of self-explanation based cognitive 
strategies for causal reasoning contexts. 
Research Question 2 
Starting from existing research (Bielaczyc, et al., 1995; Renkl, 2002) the second 
research question asks if the prior knowledge of the relevant domains (immunology, 
pathology and physiology) is related in any way to the learners’ performance on causal 
reasoning tasks. To answer this research question, two measures of prior knowledge were 
included in the analysis. One measure was self-reported, for which the participants self-
assessed their level of prior knowledge in each of the three domains related to the 
performance assessment question. The second one measured prior knowledge using a set 
of six multiple-choice questions, two for each of the three domains. The same scores 
analyzed for the first research question were studied using logistic regression and 
factorial ANCOVAs for both measures of prior knowledge.  
For the categorical performance score, the treatment (use of self-explanation as 
causal mechanism elicitation strategy) seems to improve performance for the participants 
with low prior knowledge but does not show any effect for the participants with high 
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prior knowledge. That is, for the participants who were found to have low levels of 
measured prior knowledge, being in the treatment group increases their odds of 
answering the question correctly. For self-reported prior knowledge, this strategy works 
for participants that report high levels of prior knowledge, while it shows no effect for the 
participants who report low levels of prior knowledge. 
The categorical performance score was used to measure the effect of using the 
self-explanation-based cognitive strategy on participants’ raw performance scores. In 
both analyses, the interaction between prior knowledge and treatment condition was 
significant, supporting extant research that shows prior knowledge to be important for 
performance in both causal reasoning (e.g., Ahn & Baileson, 1996; Ahn, et al., 1995; 
Thagard, 2000) and self-explanation (e.g., Bielaczyc, et al., 1995; Chi, et al., 1989; 
Kintsch, 1994). The apparent issue here is that while for measured prior knowledge the 
effect is found to be beneficial for the participants in the low prior knowledge category, 
for self-reported prior knowledge, the effect seems to be beneficial for the high prior 
knowledge participants. With the effects of the year of study removed by including it as a 
covariate in the statistical analysis, the only differentiating factor remains the method by 
which prior knowledge was measured.  
The use of two methods to estimate prior knowledge was necessary because of the 
experiment access, time and length limitations imposed by the participating institution 
which limited the number and complexity of questions that could be used to measure this 
variable. It is likely that six multiple-choice questions (two per domain) are too few to 
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reliably measure the participants’ prior knowledge23.  For this reason, considering 
existing research (e.g., Ackerman, et al., 2002; Anaya, 1999; Boud & Falchikov, 1989; 
Falchikov & Boud, 1989; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 2003), the self-
reported prior knowledge can be used reliably as a substitute measure of prior knowledge 
for advanced learners, such as graduate students, for the given experiment conditions.  
The total performance score was introduced to account for the quality of the 
mechanism explanation associated with the answer choice. For this performance score the 
analysis shows no main effects or interaction when looking at measured prior knowledge, 
but shows a significant interaction when looking at self-reported prior knowledge. For 
self-reported prior knowledge, a positive impact of the treatment condition was found for 
the participants who report having high levels of prior knowledge. No significant 
influence was found for the participants reporting low levels of prior knowledge. 
The inclusion of a score for the quality of the mechanism explanation provided a 
better estimate of the participants’ understanding of the phenomenon. As a side effect, the 
increase in variance also helped the statistical analysis.  
For self-reported prior knowledge, analysis of this measure of performance 
suggests that a certain level of prior knowledge is a prerequisite for a strategy based on 
self-explanation, applied without direct prompting, to work. That is, a prior knowledge 
threshold needs to be reached before improvements can be observed as a result of using 
this strategy. Looking from the perspective of VanLehn’s (1993) gap-filling explanation, 
                                                
23 For comparison, the board examinations the students have to take to enter a 
residency program, the USMLE STEP 1 and STEP 2 CK have 336 and 370 multiple-
choice questions respectively. Considering the number of topics reported to be assessed 
in each of the two step examinations there are, on average, 20 to 25 questions per 
domain. 
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it is probable that too little prior knowledge limits learners’ ability to recognize and fill 
knowledge gaps by themselves, without any outside intervention, as suggested by 
Kirschner (2006). This suggests that when using self-explanation as a cognitive strategy, 
a different approach for low and high prior knowledge learners, similar to those discussed 
by existing research (e.g., Atkinson, et al., 2003; Hilbert, Schworm, & Renkl, 2004), 
could be more successful. 
The adjusted performance score uses participant reported confidence in his or her own 
answer to account for the strength of participants’ causal mental model and attenuate the 
effects of the participants “guessing” the answer instead of choosing it based on sound 
causal reasoning. For the adjusted performance score, for the measured prior knowledge 
variable, the analysis shows a significant main effect of prior knowledge, with those 
participants with higher levels of prior knowledge performing better than those with 
lower levels of prior knowledge, but does not show any interaction between prior 
knowledge and the treatment condition. For self-reported prior knowledge the analysis 
shows a significant interaction between the level of prior knowledge and the treatment 
condition, suggesting significant positive effects of the treatment for those reporting high 
levels of prior knowledge but with little or no effect for those reporting low levels of 
prior knowledge. The results suggest an outcome similar to that observed for the total 
performance score and, as before, the addition of a quasi-continuous score increases 
variance and thus provides better support for the statistical analysis.  
 
Figure 7 presents an overview of the trends observed so far for the second research 
question. The uneven outcomes obtained when using an objective measure of prior 
knowledge are most likely due to the measurement shortcomings discussed before. Using 
a self-reported measure of prior knowledge provides more consistent behavior, with the 
analysis for all three scores showing a significant interaction between the treatment 
condition and the level of prior knowledge. Further analysis suggests that a cognitive 
strategy using practice of self-explanation, similar to the one used in this experiment, 
seems to help the participants in the high self-reported prior knowledge group, while 
having little or no influence for the participants reporting lower levels of prior 
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knowledge. Therefore the prior knowledge of the domain(s) seems to have a threshold 
value or range above which a cognitive strategy based on self-explanation could have 
positive effects, similar to the one used in this study.  
 
 
Figure 7: Research Question 2 - Overview of findings 
Research Question 3 
The lack of appropriate incentives for the participants to provide detailed answers 
to the performance assessment explanation prompt question significantly impacted the 
quality of the answers, thus limiting the ability of the researcher to perform an in-depth 
analysis. Nevertheless, even with suboptimal data, some of the problems researchers 
report for causal reasoning can be recognized in the participants’ answers. For example, 
the focus on the rash symptom, unrelated to the correct causal chains, as a determinant 
factor for the diagnosis for some of the participants, resonates with the issue of 
differentiated weight assigned to evidence based on understanding of the causal 
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phenomenon (Pennington & Hasties, 1988). From a different perspective, once the 
participant decided upon a diagnostic of Roseola the observed behavior is consistent with 
the tendency to favor confirming versus disconfirming evidence (Schustack & Sternberg, 
1981). The same observed behavior could also be viewed as evidence for too much focus 
on a possible cause to the detriment of other available information (Schustack & 
Sternberg, 1981).  
The tendency to express simple, linear, and sequential causal models (Bullock, et 
al., 1982; Grotzer, 2000) can also be observed in the participants’ answers. At the low 
end of the performance spectrum the causal models are nonexistent, whereas at the higher 
end, the models extracted from the participants’ explanations are simple and show the 
tendency to skip intermediate objects (e.g., Besson, 2004). Future research should either 
use a different approach to collecting qualitative data and/or include appropriate 
incentives and prompts to improve for depth and breadth of this data. 
Conclusions and Implications for Research and Practice 
Using of self-explanation based strategies, even in their weaker forms, to manage 
the issues people have with causal reasoning and causal understanding shows promise. 
Using a weak and nonintrusive intervention based on a brief practice of self-explanation 
before the task this study shows that learners reporting higher levels of prior knowledge 
of the relevant domains seem to benefit from the use of this strategy, while the learners 
reporting lower levels do not. From a theoretical research perspective, this finding 
suggests the existence of a threshold value or range of prior knowledge in the relevant 
domain(s) that needs to be reached before cognitive strategies based on self-explanation 
similar to the one used here could become effective. 
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A direct practical implication is that if the level of prior knowledge exists, 
practice-based self-explanation cognitive strategies could be easily implemented in both 
face-to-face and online situations, with almost no time cost for the learner. It is probable 
that the threshold is different for different domains and contexts. Therefore, success or 
failure to use this strategy could serve as an indication that more involved methods, such 
as multi-step prompting and training in the use of self-explanation strategies, are needed 
to support students’ causal reasoning until they accumulate sufficient domain knowledge 
to reach the threshold. For more difficult subjects learned over longer periods of time, 
more involved self-explanation based cognitive strategies could be used at the beginning 
of the period, faded afterwards to less intrusive strategies, such as the one used in this 
experiment. 
As this experiment was conducted entirely online, using a web-based application, 
there are implications for the design of online instruction and of online learning 
environments. With proper preparation, support for self-explanation based cognitive 
strategies is easy to implement in online environments, and has the potential to provide 
significant gains in learner performance with minimal intrusion and cost. Expanding on 
this idea, use of appropriate scaffolding and prompting could impact a variety of 
computer-based tools which could benefit from implementing support for cognitive 
strategies to aid causal reasoning and understanding through causal mechanism 
elicitation. For example, when needed, causal mapping or concept mapping tools could 
include components to elicit and use causal mechanisms when developing causal or 
concept maps in cases where increased depth and reliability are needed.  
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Limitations 
Various events and conditions weighed on the design, deployment, and data 
collection in this study. Most of the limiting factors were introduced throughout this 
document to account for design decisions, data quality issues or unexpected outcomes. 
Below is a summary of the most relevant of these limitations and of their effects. 
The participating institution imposed the most important limitations to this 
research. The areas affected were the type of access to their students and the length and 
complexity of the tasks these students could be asked to perform. First, the number of 
instrument elements that could be dedicated to measuring prior knowledge by objective 
measures was severely limited, leading to less useful data. Without access to other 
objective measures of prior knowledge, such as examination or test grades, the analysis 
was limited to self-reported measures of prior knowledge. Improved and more fine-
grained measurement of prior knowledge would have helped in better defining the prior 
knowledge threshold from which such strategies become effective. Second, the suggested 
length (time) and difficulty of the instrument components limited the depth and breadth 
of the performance measurement tasks, thus constraining the types of statistical tests that 
could be used to analyze the data and thus the power to observe and confirm trends and 
causal relations. 
The online delivery of this experiment impacted the ability of the researcher to 
control for participants’ behavior during the experiment. This limitation mainly affected 
the quality and detail of participants’ explanations, limiting the depth and breadth of the 
qualitative analysis designed for the experiment. In addition, no control over the 
environment in which the experiment took place left open the possibility of external 
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interfering factors affecting the participant’s performance. Therefore, the results provided 
by the qualitative analysis must be interpreted with care and only within the boundaries 
(including the limitations) of the present experiment. 
Another factor that could have affected the outcomes of this experiment both 
positively and negatively is its timing at the end of the semester and school year when 
students are facing more concurrent activities than usual. Among the positive effects are 
the ability to recruit first year medical students to participate in the research and the 
increased reliability in self-reported measures of prior knowledge of relevant domains. 
The negative effects are related to the time and effort the participants were willing to 
spend on completing the experiment’s tasks, with negative effects on the depth, breadth 
and quality of the data collected. 
Implications for Future Research 
This research makes only a small step toward understanding how cognitive 
strategies can support causal reasoning and understanding in people. As a natural 
continuation, future research should be developed to test the observed behaviors using a 
better objective measure of prior knowledge as well as an expanded performance 
measurement task. Further studies should also look at how the type and timing of 
prompts used to elicit self-explanation affect performance. The potential outcome would 
be the development of a best practices roadmap for the use of self-explanation based 
strategies to aid learning and the understanding of causality. With this in mind, the 
research can be further extended to other cognitive strategies aimed at eliciting 
mechanism explanations during causal reasoning. 
 105 
 
The nature and level of the prior knowledge threshold above which practice of 
self-explanation based cognitive strategies begins to become effective is worthy of 
further investigation. From this perspective, it would be interesting for example, to find 
what type(s) of knowledge (e.g. factual, process, etc.) is more important and why. As 
practical applications of cognitive strategies such as the one used in this study depend on 
the ability to estimate the various variables in the equation, future studies should also 
look for ways of estimating this threshold level. 
With little research, at best, on methodologies and tools capable of improving 
people’s causal reasoning and understanding, the research field is open to look at a 
variety of cognitive strategies. Looking only at self-explanation, future research could 
study its effects on causal reasoning and understanding in various domains and 
disciplines, using different delivery methods (e.g., mixed), or for different types of 
groups (e.g., small vs. large).  
With causal mechanism elicitation cognitive strategies able to improve people’s 
performance on causal reasoning tasks, future studies could look at various methods of 
implementing such strategies in a variety of practical applications, ranging from concept 
mapping to decision making. 
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APPENDIX 1 - Influence Diagram for Asthma 
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APPENDIX 2 - Instrument Workflow
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APPENDIX 3 - Research Instrument 
The instrument presented below is mirrored online on the website where the 
experiment is delivered. The application URL is [http://rmed.gionas.webfactional.com]. 
Informed Consent 
You are invited to participate in this study titled "Impact of self-explanation on 
causal reasoning". This study is not intended to assess your knowledge, but to study the 
way you use causal reasoning and explanations. 
This consent requests your permission to allow the researcher to collect and 
analyze your answers and work done while using this website, as well as use the results 
of such analyzes in presentations at conferences and for printed publications. 
Your participation in this study is voluntary and there are no anticipated risks or 
discomforts to you. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time with no 
questions asked and no repercussions to you. If you are a student, the decision to decline 
participation or withdraw will not affect your grades or academic standing in any way. 
All answers are confidential and will be available to the researcher only. Your identity or 
any data that could identify you will never be communicated to anyone. For analysis 
identification data will be replaced with codes. 
If you have any questions about this research and your participation, now or at 
any time, please feel free to contact: 
Ioan Gelu IONAS 
School of Information Science and Learning Technologies 
University of Missouri - Columbia 
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111 London Hall 
igieeb@missouri.edu 
For additional information regarding human participation in research please 
contact either the KCOM IRB Office at (660) 626-2316 or the UMC Campus IRB Office 
at (573) 882-9585. 
By providing your name and e-mail address as requested below and continuing to 
the website, you acknowledge that you understand the conditions of this invitation, 
voluntarily agree to participate in this study, and allow the results to be used for the 
research purposes stated above. 
[First Name entry field] 
[Last Name entry field] 
[e-mail address entry field] 
<Continue> 
Assessment of Prior Knowledge 
Researcher note: Both experiment groups will be asked to perform the same tasks 
in the prior knowledge assessment section. 
Self-Assessment of Prior Knowledge 
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “Nothing at all” and 10 means “I am an 
expert”, how would you rate your knowledge of: 
• Physiology 
• Pathology 
• Immunology 
Multiple Choice Questions for Prior Knowledge Assessment 
 110 
 
 
Question 1: The effect of sympathetic nervous system include (check all that 
apply:) 
6. Contraction of the bladder detrusor muscle (F) 
7. Papillary dilation (T) 
8. Reduced gastrointestinal motility (T) 
9. Constricts bronchiole smooth muscle (F) 
10. Constricts skin and mucus membrane blood vessels (T) 
 
Question 2: A 28 week premature infant receives surfactant through endotracheal 
tube. Which of the following would you expect? 
11. Decrease in alveolar surface tension and increase in lung compliance 
(Correct) 
12. Increased alveolar surface tension and decreased lung compliance 
13. Increased alveolar surface tension and no change in lung compliance 
14. Decrease in alveolar surface tension and decrease in lung compliance. 
 
Question 3: In the presence of inflammation the following are raised (check all 
that apply): 
15. Platelets (T) 
16. Ferritin (T) 
17. Caeruloplasmin (T) 
18. Fibrinogen (T) 
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19. Complement proteins (T) 
 
Question 4: An 18 month old infant male presents with sudden onset of cough. 
Suspecting a foreign body aspiration in which area of the lung does this happen more 
frequently? 
20. Left upper pulmonary lobe 
21. Right upper pulmonary lobe 
22. Right lower pulmonary lobe (Correct) 
23. Left lower pulmonary lobe 
 
Question 5: The following are true about lymphocytes (check all that apply): 
1. T cells account for 20% of the circulating lymphocytes (F) 
2. In the spleen, B cells are found in the periarteriolar areas of white pulp (F) 
3. In the lymph nodes, T cells occupy the paracortical area surrounding the 
germinal centers (T) 
4. B cells but not T cells express surface IgG (T) 
5. B cells undergo maturation in the bone marrow (T) 
 
Question 6: Three days ago, a 13-year-old boy developed a pruritic, migratory, 
urticarial rash on his torso, face and extremities, and mild edema of his hands and feet. 
He had been well until he developed symptoms of an upper respiratory tract infection. He 
had a fever initially, but that has now resolved. He has taken one dose each of 
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acetaminophen and ibuprofen, but no other medications. He has no history of urticaria, 
drug allergy, or adverse reactions to food. 
 Which of the following is the most likely cause of his illness? 
1. Allergy to food flavoring 
2. Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug reaction 
3. IgE response to acetaminophen 
4. Infectious-triggered urticaria (Correct) 
5. Underlying autoimmune disease 
Treatment 
Researcher note: In this section, which provides the participants with self-
explanation practice opportunities, the treatment consists of the overt request to explain 
mechanisms that are at work within the presented context. This requirement is for the 
participants assigned to the treatment group only. 
Scenario 1 
Both groups: A 10-year-old child presents with a persistent sinus infection. Over 
the course of the last 5 years, the patient has had several sinus and upper respiratory 
infections. Blood tests reveal abnormally low levels of IgA immunoglobulin, but normal 
levels of their isotopes. 
Treatment group only (open-ended mechanism self-explanation): What 
mechanisms are most probable at play in this case? 
Both groups: The patient’s recurrent infections are most likely due to a defect of 
which of the following? 
1. Fixation of complement 
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2. Mast cell activation 
3. Mucosal immunity (Correct) 
4. Neutrophil activation 
5. Opsonization of bacteria 
Scenario 2 
Both groups: A 9-year-old boy is brought to the emergency room because of 
vomiting, abdominal cramps, and difficulty breathing. Symptoms began 30 minutes ago 
while he was dining in a restaurant. Temperature is 37.20C, pulse rate 140/min, 
respiratory rate 30/min, and blood pressure 90/60 mm Hg. Eczema is seen in the flexural 
folds and blanching, erythematous rash is present on the trunk and face. Expiratory 
wheezing is heard.  
Treatment group only (open-ended mechanism self-explanation): What kind of 
reaction is this and which is/are the most probably mechanism(s) by which it is 
produced? 
Both groups: Which of the following is the most likely diagnosis? 
1. Anaphylaxis (Correct) 
2. Asthma 
3. Food poisoning 
4. Gastroenteritis 
5. Drug ingestion 
Scenario 3 
Both groups: In a teenager who gets stung by a bee, urticaria develops within 30 
minutes of the sting. 
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Treatment group only (open-ended mechanism self-explanation): What type of 
reaction is this and which is/are the most probable mechanism(s) by which a bee sting 
produces urticaria? 
Both groups: This reaction is most probably mediated by: 
1. Complement component C3 
2. Immunoglobulin E (IgE) antibodies (Correct) 
3. Neutrophils 
4. Natural killer (NK) cells 
Transfer Task 
Researcher note: The tasks in this section are the same for all participants. 
Step 1: Multiple-choice Question 
A 3-year-old male, known with seasonal allergies, presents at the clinic with 
difficulty breathing - increased respiratory rate, wheezing, and cough. Symptoms started 
two days ago. No fever. Parents noted this morning a fine rash appearing on his abdomen. 
The rash seems to be getting worse. 
Which of the following is the most probable diagnostic? 
1. Anaphylaxis 
2. Asthma exacerbation (Correct answer) 
3. Pneumonia 
4. Foreign body aspiration 
5. Roseola 
Step 2: Open-ended Mechanism Explanation 
What are the mechanisms that suggest your diagnosis? 
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Step 3: Confidence Question 
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is “Not confident at all” and 10 means “I am 
sure”, how confident are you that your answer is correct? 
Step 4: Choice for Review 
Do you want to change your answer? 
Researcher note: If the answer to this question is “Yes”, then go to Step 5. If the 
answer is “No”, go to next section. 
Step 5: Review 
Researcher note: Present information in Step 1 again and highlight previous 
answer. Show answer (choice and explanation) from question in Step 2. Allow participant 
to choose a different answer. 
Ask question (open-ended): Why did you change your answer and why and how is 
the new answer better than the first one?  
Demographics 
Question 1: In which age group are you? (choices: <20; 20-25; 25-30; 30-35; 35-
40; >4) 
Question 2: Are you a Male or a Female 
Question 3: In which of the following income groups are you? (choices <$20K, 
$20K-$40K, $40K-$80K, $80K-$150K, >$150K) 
Question 4: Which medical specialty do you intend to pursue? (open-ended) 
Wrap-up and Feedback 
Researcher note: This last section shows a thank you note for participating in the 
research and offers the participant the option to review his/her answers to the 10 multiple-
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choice questions in this study. If the participant decides s/he wants to review, each 
question will be reviewed on a separate page. 
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APPENDIX 4 - Think-aloud Protocol 
[Introduction] 
“We’re here with Dr. _______________ to assess, from an expert’s point of view, 
the answers subjects provided to a complex question which combines a multiple choice 
answer with an explanation for an experiment on causal reasoning and understanding.” 
[Task description] 
“Dr. ______________, your task today is to score the answers presented to you, 
in the order they are presented. For scoring, I would suggest you to use a differential 
scale, ranging from -3 to +3, where -3 for the worst answers while +3 is for the best 
answers. If you believe that this scale is not appropriate for scoring these answers, could 
you suggest a different one?” 
“In the table in front of you, for each line, when beginning assessment of a new 
subject’s answer, speak aloud the number in the first column. This number uniquely 
identifies a subject’s answer so it can be used in further analysis. The second column is 
the answer choice the subject made and the third column is the explanation s/he provided 
for that choice. The correct choice was ‘Asthma exacerbation’. Please use the last column 
to mark the score and make notes if necessary.”  
“During the entire process please verbalize your scoring process by verbalizing 
your thoughts. Be aware that I might intervene occasionally, depending on situation, to 
maintain this process in line with these instructions. For example, if you stop verbalizing 
your thoughts, I will intervene and remind you to do so.” 
[Address expert’s questions and concerns] 
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“This is all I had to say. At this point, do you have any questions or concerns you 
need to address?” 
[If Yes] 
Go on and address the expert’s questions and concerns. 
[Ask for consent] 
Do you agree for the information you provide during the session today to be 
recorded and used, as is or interpreted, for the purposes of this research, in publications, 
and reports? If you agree, please say ‘Yes, I agree’. If not, please say ‘No, I do not agree’.  
[If consent not obtained] 
“Thank you for accepting to consider helping with this research. Since you do not 
accept to allow the researcher to record and use the information you provide during this 
session we cannot continue at this time.” 
“Would you like to change your decision?” [state the consent statement again] 
[Begin] 
“Let’s start with the first subject.” 
[At the end] 
“We have concluded this assessment session and I would like to thank you for 
your help in conducting this research.”  
[Address expert’s questions and concerns] 
“If you have any questions, concerns, or remarks or comments you would like to 
ask or make, please feel free to do so.” 
[If Yes] 
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Listen to what the expert has to say and address any eventual questions and 
concerns s/he may have. 
[Thank you] 
“Thank you again for helping with this research.” 
Contingencies 
[If the subject becomes quiet] 
Use one of the prompts below or other similar prompt, but do not interfere with 
the expert’s thought process. 
I’d like to hear what you’re thinking 
If you could just say whatever words come to your mind 
Please speak up 
[At key junctions] 
When learning something new that is key to understanding, summarize the event 
and the thinking that the user explored, very briefly. Ask the participant to provide more 
detail.  
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APPENDIX 5 - Scoring Rubric 
Symptoms and related keywords. They represent mostly a repetition of the correct 
and relevant symptoms presented to the participants in the problem: seasonal allergies, 
difficulty breathing (increased respiratory rate, wheezing, cough, no fever), allergens. 
The presence of relevant keywords are an indication that the participant has an 
understanding of the symptoms, recognized the situation, and decided not to repeat the 
symptoms from the scenario (IgE, mast cell, histamine, cytokine, T-helper lymphocytes). 
For this item, scores are awarded as follows: 
0 if none of the relevant symptoms or keywords are found in the answer 
+1 all or some of the relevant symptoms are present 
+2 presence of relevant keywords with or without symptoms. 
-1 if incorrect or non-relevant symptoms are present in the wrong context (the 
rash for example, which is not necessarily relevant in this case, but only if it presented by 
itself or in the wrong context) 
Level of detail is represented by how deep the participant reaches with the 
explanation. The most detailed level of explanation expected by the expert was at the cell 
level. There are two elements for a complete answer: a) mentioning the Immunoglobulin 
E (IgE) and b) one mentioning the cell processes (mast cell degranulation processes). 
Scores are awarded as follows: 
0 if no detail is present in the explanation (see the other scores for examples) 
+1 if the participant mentions either a) or b) 
+2 if the participant mentions both a) and b) 
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+1 An additional point can be awarded for really detailed explanations for each or 
both of the two elements. Keywords indicative for a more detailed explanation are: T 
helper cells, cytokine). 
Presence of mechanisms, represented by the presence of correct sequences of 
relevant events that occur in an asthma attack. Scores are awarded as follows: 
0 if no evidence of a relevant mechanism is found in the answer 
+1 if the answer mentions disparate correct sequences (aka. Mechanisms). For 
example, mentioning just one causal link such as a) the presence of a mediated reaction, 
b) mast cell degranulation, c) histamine or cytokine release, d) mast cell proliferation, e) 
mediated response to allergens, etc could serve as an indication for the existence of a 
causal relation. 
+2 for the presence of correct chains of such causal relations. For example, a more 
complex example here would be a) inflammatory reaction goes in the asthma, leading to 
mast cell proliferation, leading to wheezing, by bronchoconstriction, to cough, increased 
respiratory rate or b) mentioning the mast cells and the histamine and the fact that 
histamine produces other relevant reactions at the bronchiolar level: bronchospasm, 
inflammation, and edema of the bronchiole tree.  
-1 for the presence of incorrect causal relations (linking the rash to Roseola - it is 
correct to link it since rash is part of the roseola symptoms, but not in the context of this 
scenario since many other viral infections can produce a rash). This should be carefully 
considered to be in the appropriate context (e.g., some respondents might have attempted 
to explain by eliminating the other alternative answers). 
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APPENDIX 6 - Extended calculations for logistic regression with measured prior 
knowledge 
The generic equation for the logistic regression is:  
Logit(p) = β0 + β1 sgrp + β2mpk + β3sgrpmpk + β4yr 
where: 
sgrp – represents the experiment group variable 
mpk – represents the measured prior knowledge variable 
yr – represents the covariate, year of study. 
From the logistic regression output (Table 16) the beta coefficients of this 
regression equation are:  
β0 = -1.718 β1 = 0   β2 = 0   β3 = - 0.950 β4 = 1.014 
To help the analysis the regression equation will be analyzed for each of the two 
levels of the self-reported prior knowledge individually. This analysis will produce two 
regression equations, one for each level of the variable (Low and High). The year of 
study is included as a covariate for control purposes and will not be included in the 
analysis. 
For high measured prior knowledge participants (setting the mpk variable to 0 
according to the categorical variables coding scheme), the regression equation is: 
Logit(p) = -1.718 + 1.014yr 
The obtained equation does not contain a term for the experiment group. This 
leads to the conclusion that the experiment group does not influence the odds of 
answering the problem correctly versus answering it incorrectly for the participants in the 
high measured prior knowledge group.  
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For the low measured prior knowledge participants (setting the mpk variable to 1 
according to the categorical variables coding scheme), the regression equation is: 
Logit(p) = -1.718 – 0.950sgrp + 1.014yr 
According to this regression equation, the odds ratio for the experiment group 
variable is: 
odds ratio = e-0.950 = 0.387 
This odds ratio shows that for the participants with low measured prior knowledge 
the odds of answering the question correctly versus the odds of answering it incorrectly 
are decreased by a factor of 0.387 by being in the control group (the group for which the 
prediction is being made, coded with 1) than in the treatment group (the reference group, 
coded with 0). 
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APPENDIX 7 – Extended calculations for logistic regression with self-reported prior 
knowledge 
The generic equation for the logistic regression is:  
Logit(p) = β0 + β1 sgrp + β2mpk + β3sgrpmpk + β4yr 
where: 
sgrp – represents the experiment group variable 
srpk – represents the prior knowledge variable 
yr – represents the covariate, year of study. 
From the logistic regression output ( 
Table 20) the beta coefficients of this regression equation are:  
β0 = -2.052 β1 = 0   β2 = -0.999  β3 = 1.472 β4 = 1.130 
To help the analysis the regression equation will be analyzed for each of the two 
levels of the self-reported prior knowledge individually. This analysis will produce two 
regression equations, one for each level of the variable (Low and High). The year of 
study is included as a covariate for control purposes and will not be included in the 
analysis. 
For low self-reported prior knowledge (setting the srpk variable to 0 according to 
the categorical variables coding scheme), the regression equation is: 
Logit(p) = -2.052 + 1.130yr 
The obtained equation does not contain a term for the experiment group. This 
leads to the conclusion that the experiment group does not influence the odds of 
answering the problem correctly versus answering it incorrectly for the participants in the 
low self-reported prior knowledge group.  
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For the high self-reported prior knowledge participants (setting the srpk variable 
to 1 according to the categorical variables coding scheme), the regression equation is: 
Logit(p) = -2.052 – 0.999 + 1.472sgrp + 1.140yr = -3.051 + 1.472sgrp + 1.140yr 
According to this regression equation, the odds ratio for the experiment group 
variable is: 
odds ratio = e1.472 = 4.385 
This odds ratio shows that for the participants with high self-reported prior 
knowledge the odds of answering the question correctly versus the odds of answering it 
incorrectly are increased by a factor of 4.358 by being in the treatment group (the group 
for which the prediction is being made, coded with 1) than in the control group (the 
reference group, coded with 0). 
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APPENDIX 8 – Screenshots of the experiment website 
The following screenshots present the experiment website pages in the order they 
were presented to the participants. The differences between the control and treatment 
groups are mentioned in the caption text. 
 
Introduction page and login 
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Instructions for the participants 
 
Self-reported prior knowledge 
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Prior knowledge measurement – Example of all that apply multiple-choice question 
 
 
Prior knowledge measurement – Example of all that apply multiple-choice question 
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Example of practice question – Control group (NO explanation required) 
 
 
Example of practice question – Treatment group (explanation required) 
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Performance measurement question 
 
 
Mechanism explanation required for the performance measurement question 
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Confidence in the correctness of own answer 
 
 
All participants are offered the possibility to change the answer 
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Answer change page – participants are asked to provide an explanation for the change 
 
Demographic data collection 
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Offer to review the answers 
 
Answer review page (10 questions = 6 for prior knowledge, 3 for practice, and 1 for 
performance measurement. 
 134 
 
 
Experiment completion message. 
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